Tuesday, January 12, 2021

Rebooting Economy 57: When and how will industry take India to next level of growth?

 Despite continuous and comprehensive attention to industry, its contribution to income (GDP) and employment didn't touch 25% and 14%, respectively. It is time to give equal, if not more, attention to services and agriculture that consistently contribute the most to income and employment, respectively

twitter-logoPrasanna Mohanty | January 11, 2021 | Updated 07:10 IST
Rebooting Economy 57: When and how will industry take India to next level of growth?
The only new initiative to boost industrial production is the AatmaNirbhar Bharat Abhiyan launched on May 12, 2020

India has struggled long and hard to industrialise and turn into a developed, high-income and prosperous economy like the US, many European countries, Japan, South Korea and others but has consistently failed.

In 1950-51, industry contributed 11.1% to national income (GDP) - as per the 2004-05 GDP series, constant prices - and 9.3% to employment (EPW, December 3, 1966). Manufacturing, its main component (others being mining and utilities), contributed 8.9% to national income (GDP) and 8.8% to employment.

More than seven decades later, their contributions have improved, but not significantly, and are confined to a very narrow band, nowhere close to those of industrialised nations.

Poor contribution to GDP and employment

The following graph maps the share of industry and its main component, manufacturing, in the GDP (national income) since 1950-51.

Industry's share of GDP never touched 25%; manufacturing's share never touched 20%.

The rest 75% or more of the national income (GDP) comes from agriculture and services - the most neglected sectors of the Indian economy. The services sector virtually grew on its own to contribute more than 60% to the GDP. (For more read "Rebooting Economy 56: Why India should follow agricultural development-led industrialisation growth model ")

When it comes to employment, it is even worse.

The industry's contribution never touched 14%, peaking at 13.1% in FY05, and manufacturing peaking at 12.2% in the same fiscal.

The rest 86% or more comes from agriculture and services - which never received the attention and care that industry has.

The first two graphs demonstrate how India's economic policies have spectacularly failed to make India a developed and prosperous economy, even in the post-1980 reform era.

Make no mistake, industry has been pampered for decades through policy supports; virtually free land, mines and minerals (until the Supreme Court intervened in 2013 and asked for auctioning of natural resources after the 2G scam); tax cuts, tax holidays and fiscal stimulus; liberal bank credits/liquidity infusion and routine write-off of loan defaults (NPAs) etc.

The primary policy focus continues firmly on industry, particularly on manufacturing.

Growth without jobs

There is a good case for promoting manufacturing though, because that is how industrialised countries grew rich and prosperous.

The last plan (12th Five-Year Plan) of the erstwhile Planning Commission, which was released in 2013, made its case for boosting manufacturing through the following two graphs.

Also Read: Rebooting Economy 55: Farmer producer organisations best bet for small, marginal farmers

The first shows the growth of India's manufacturing was lower than that of its GDP during 1999-2009, while the reverse was true forpost-war success storieswhich witnessed rapid industrialisation. The second shows the share of India's manufacturing stuck at about 15% of its GDP, which is considerably lower than the others (double or more than that in China, South Korea and Thailand).

The 12thPlan acknowledged the manufacturing's failure, particularly in providing employment, which, it said, saw a decline in absolute terms from 55.8 million to 50.7 million (loss of 5 million jobs) between 2004-2005 and 2009-10, although, the total employment during this period had grown from 457.5 million to 460 million (gain of 2.76 million).

This was the genesis of the infamous "job-less growth" narrative during the UPA-II because those were the years when India's growth was at its peak.

During this period, the GDP growth was an annual average of 6.9%, as per the 2011-12 GDP series and 8% as per the 2004-05 series (both at constant prices). Manufacturing growth was also robust then - 10% growth in manufacturing-GVA as per the 2011-12 GDP series and 6% growth in manufacturing-GDP as per the 2004-05 series (both at constant prices).

When the Planning Commission released a fresh datasheet on sector-wise employment a year later in 2014, it turned out that the job loss in manufacturing was 7.2 million during 2004-05 and 2009-10 (from 55.77 million to 48.54 million) - more than 5 million that the 12th Plan had said. The total employment remained unchanged (from 457.5 million to 460 million) in this datasheet.

Also Read: Rebooting Economy 54: Will bypassing APMC-based procurement improve farmers' income, ensure food security?

Why jobs matter if economy is growing?

Jobs are the primary means of redistribution of wealth. If an economy is growing and generating wealth but not creating enough jobs, it means the benefits of growth are not reaching the rest of population and the wealth is concentrating in the hands of a few.

To address job-loss in manufacturing, the 12th Plan said "emphasis should be given to creation of appropriate skill sets among the rural migrant and urban poor" and raise manufacturing sector growth to 12-14% over the medium term "to make it the engine of growth".

As for the industry as a whole, the 12th Plan said "architecture of the industrial policy" needs to change to boost its growth. Instead of a hands-off approach of the reform era India should learn and adopt the approach of post-war success stories (Japan, South Korea, China) in growing competitiveness and scale of their manufacturing: Close coordination between producers and government policymakers, with governments playing active role in providing incentives for domestic industrial growth and in relieving constraints on industrial competitiveness.

This marked a significant change in India's approach to industry/manufacturing in the 'era of planning' that continues today.

In the first few decades of India's independence, state (government) actively participated in production, exercised tight control over resources and private enterprises and then adopted import substitution policy to protect local manufacturers. In the post-reform era starting with 1980s, private enterprises were given a free hand to manufacture and trade with policy and financial incentives.

Also Read: Rebooting Economy 53: Why crop insurance is losing traction in India

More of the same in post-planning era

After the UPA-II government was replaced with the NDA-II, the Planning Commission was dismantled, ending the era of planning - centralised or otherwise. But the old policies and practices continued.

The first Economic Survey of 2014-15 of the new government acknowledged the problem of 'job-less growth' but couched it differently on the plea that long-term employment trends are difficult to interpret because of bewildering multiplicity of data sources, methodology and coverage.

It said: "One tentative conclusionis that there has probably been a decline in long run employment growth in the 2000s relative to the 1990s and probably also a decline in the employment elasticity of growth: that is, a given amount of growth leads to fewer jobs created than in the past."

It did, like the Planning Commission, build up a case for skilling the Indian workforce, which is largely unskilled. The new government adopted the UPA-II era National Manufacturing Policy (NMP) of 2011, which set the goal of raising manufacturing's share to 25% of the GDP, although it was re-christened and re-launched as "Make in India" in 2014 with the same stated goal.

In 2019 came the Periodic Labour Force Survey (PLFS) of 2017-18 (the previous one was the PLFS of 2011-12) which showed India's unemployment rate had touched 45-year high at 6.1%. Analysis of its unit-level by the Azim Premji University concluded that India had lost 9 million jobs during 2011-12 and 2017-18 and that "this (job loss) happened for the first time in India's history".  

Manufacturing had lost 3.2 million jobs - 37% of the total job loss of 9 million. The magnitude of the job loss would have been far greater had the services not added 17.1 million jobs.

A year earlier, in 2018, the Azim Premji University had published another study that showed a clear disconnect between growth and job creation. That study said in 1970s and 1980s, when the GDP growth was 3-4%, the employment growth was 2% but since 1990s and particularly in 2000s the GDP growth had accelerated to 7% but the employment growth had slowed down to 1% or less.

Why this happened or would continue to happen is known: Technological advances (automation, artificial intelligence, machine learning etc.) are rapidly displacing humans with machines for work.

Also Read: Rebooting Economy 52: The unfinished agenda of land reforms nobody talks about

Is India industrialising or de-industrialising?

This is a basic question not many dare to ask or answer.

Former Chief Economic Advisor (CEA) Arvind Subramanian did in his very first Economic Survey of 2014-15 mentioned earlier.

In a segment titled "Expansion or Pre-mature non-Industrialisation?" Subramanian wrote that it was a stylised fact that the process of development included stages of industrialisation followed by de-industrialisation after which the services sector becomes more important.

But about India, he wrote: "...the sobering fact is that India seems to be de-industrialising too (like some low-income African economies). In fact, to call the Indian phenomenon de-industrialisation is to dignify the Indian experience, which is more aptly referred to as premature non-industrialisation because India never industrialised sufficiently in the first place."

To prove his point, he presented the following two graphs - one on South Korea, "a poster-child for manufacturing-led growth", and the other on India.

The graph on South Korea showed a "typical shape", he wrote, that is, the share of manufacturing started very low at 5% and rose to almost 30% before starting to decline but not before a fairly high level of GDP was reached.

Also read: Rebooting Economy 51: Where is India's vision, plan for sustained agriculture growth and farmers' welfare?

In contrast, the pronounced U-shape of South Korean graph was missing for India, that is, the share of India's manufacturing in output and employment "had hardly changed in 30 years".

The state of manufacturing in states was equally sobering even among the leaders. Some of the key findings of the 2014-15 Economic Survey were:

  • Gujarat is the only state in which manufacturing surpassed 20% of GSDP; Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu peaked at 18-19% of their GSDP.
  • In no state manufacturing's share of employment reached more than 6.2% in past 30 years; in Gujarat, it has been 5%.
  • Except Himachal Pradesh and Gujarat, all states have seen a decline in manufacturing share; in Maharashtra it peaked in 1980s and in Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu in 1990s.
  • Manufacturing has been declining in poorer states that never effectively industrialised, like West Bengal and Bihar, they are de-industrialising.

The reasons for such a situation are: (i) distortions in labour, capital and land markets and (ii) shift of manufacturing to a fairly skill-intensive activity while India has abundant supply of low-skilled labour.

None of these reasons is unknown or unaddressed, but no significant impact has been noticed (the first two graphs have demonstrated).

Subramanian sought to address the second part (ii) and advocated that instead of trying to revive unskilled manufacturing (which "would be history-defying achievement because there are not many examples of significant reversals of de-industrialisation") India should skill its workforce (like the 12th Plan) which "will at least ensure that future generations can take advantage of lost opportunities".

Also Read: Rebooting Economy 49: Who needs corporates to run banks and how will it help Indian economy?

The "Skill India" programme was launched with big fanfare in 2015 by re-christening the existing skilling programme that was kick-started during UPA-I with the establishment of National Skill Development Corporation (NSDC) in 2008.

It made big promises, set high targets but soon lost steam and is now forgotten. A visit to its website shows the programme has been reduced to a dashboard of myriad numbers with no credible achievement to show.

AatmaNirbhar Bharat is no solution

The only new initiative to boost industrial production is the AatmaNirbhar Bharat Abhiyan launched on May 12, 2020 (FY21) at 8 pm live telecast.

This programme takes India back to 1960s and 1970s when import substitution was pursued to protect local industries from global competition and ended up as a big failure: Indians were saddled with inferior goods; there was perennial shortage of supply (waiting for phones or scooters); India's goods were not competitive globally and hence export did not grow.

That inward-looking, regressive policy had to be dismantled. The fate of AatmaNirbhar Bharat is unlikely to be different. (For more read "Rebooting Economy 45: What is AatmaNirbhar Bharat and where will it take India? ")

Now there is an additional problem.

Post-liberalisation, export has improved and Indian manufacturing is better in quality and more competitive. However, it is heavily dependent on imported inputs. Called "import intensity of export", India's export of manufacturing goods now comprises of 51% of inputs imported from abroad. Thus, import restrictions that the AatmaNirbhar entails will harm export and limit India's growth prospects. (For more read "Rebooting Economy 50: Economic reforms for whom and for what? ")

What next?

There is no fresh policy thinking or solution on the table to boost manufacturing or industry yet. Nobody seems to be looking for it either.

Until a new policy decision is made, here is an idea to ponder over: How about giving proportionate attention to agriculture that provides the maximum employment (more than 40% of the total workforce) and services that provides the maximum income (more than 60% of GDP), instead of disproportionate attention to industry/manufacturing that has done neither in the past 70 years?

Rebooting Economy 56: Why India should follow agricultural development-led industrialisation growth model

 Most successful, industrialised and fast-growing Asian economies like Japan, South Korea, China, and Vietnam followed this model, as did Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand. Why can't India?

twitter-logoPrasanna Mohanty | January 6, 2021 | Updated 21:06 IST
Rebooting Economy 56: Why India should follow agricultural development-led industrialisation growth model
Agriculture's share of gross capital formation (GCF) fell from 8.5% of the total GCF of economy in FY12 to 6.5% in FY19

The economic reforms that began slowly in 1980s and got turbo-charged in 1991 did bring high growth, but this growth is perhaps unlike what was anticipated. The Lewisian structural transformation - resources shifting from low productive agriculture to high productive manufacturing (industrialisation) that brought prosperity to developed economies in the West (the US and parts of Europe) and the East (Japan, Korea and China's Taipei) - did not occur.

Instead, India witnessed a growth led by the services sector, like some of the African countries (Tanzania and Ethiopia), the long-term implications of which are not known yet. Surplus labour in agriculture did shift (census results show a fall of 9 million cultivators between 2001 and 2011) from rural to urban areas but the massive reverse migration (from urban to rural areas) witnessed during the lockdown has changed the dynamics of labour market about which nothing can be said with any certainty because the Indian government didn't bother to track the development nor collected relevant data.

Also Read: Rebooting Economy 55: Farmer producer organisations best bet for small, marginal farmers

The following graph uses GDP series (constant prices) of 2004-05 (from 1980-81 to 2012-13) and 2011-12 (from 2004-05 to 2019-20) to map the sectoral contributions since 1980-81.

Key noticeable features of this growth are:

  • Share of industry, which was 11% in 1950-51, touched 20% for the first time in 1987-88, peaked at 24% in FY10 and FY11 and then fell to 22% in FY20.
  • Services, which surpassed agriculture in its contribution in the mid-1960s, zoomed past 50% in 1991-92, crossed 60% mark in FY05 and maintains its overwhelming lead since then.
  • Agriculture has declined sharply from 52% in 1950-51 to 14.6% in FY20. The sudden surge noticed during FY05 and FY09 is due to a significant rise in minimum support price (MSP), says eminent economist and statistician Pronab Sen, underlying the significance of MSP.
  • The 2011-12 series increased the share of agriculture and industry but lowered that of services since 2011-12 as some of its components were added to the industry.

Also Read: Rebooting Economy 54: Will bypassing APMC-based procurement improve farmers' income, ensure food security?

Despite a sharp fall in its share of national income (GDP), agriculture remains a disproportionately large employer, reflecting that a large part of the population is surviving on meagre incomes.

The government no longer provides employment share of different sectors. The following graph uses data from the erstwhile Planning Commission of India and the ILO estimate for 2019 - closest match to the fiscal year 2019-20 - to show the sectoral share of employment.

The graph shows agriculture provided employment to 43.2% of India's total workforce; industry's share is stagnant (from 11.9% to 13.16%) while the services' share-44.2%-risen to surpass that of agriculture in FY20.

This combination of low income and high employment in agriculture is what makes India's growth unsustainable.

Also Read: Rebooting Economy 53: Why crop insurance is losing traction in India

Gap in farm and non-farm incomes

The government has not made any attempt to map farm and non-farm incomes in the past six years despite promising to double farmers' income.

The only estimate that exists post-2014 is that of Prof. Ramesh Chand and his colleagues in their 2015 paper "Estimates and Analysis of Farm Income in India, 1983-84 to 2011-12" published in the Economic and Political Weekly. The Niti Aayog used this estimate in its March 2017 policy paper "Doubling Farmers' Income".

Prof. Chand wrote another paper in 2017, "Doubling Farmers' Income: Strategy and Prospects", in which he said: "It is ironic that estimates of farmers' income are not published by the CSO, though time series and year-wise estimates of sectoral income for agriculture are available in National Accounts Statistics."

He became a member of the Niti Aayog, apex government think tank that replaced the Planning Commission, in 2015 and holds the rank of Minister of State in the Government of India. Six years down the line, there is no sign of such estimates from the CSO (Central Statistical Office), the Niti Aayog or from Prof. Chand himself. He did not respond to a mail (that his office insisted on) requesting to share his latest estimates.

Also Read: Rebooting Economy 52: The unfinished agenda of land reforms nobody talks about

Prof. Chand had further said in his 2017 paper that "low level of absolute income as well as large and deteriorating disparity between income of a farmer and non-agricultural worker constitutes an important reason for the emergence of agrarian distress in the country since 1990s" and also for "a sharp increase in the number of farmers' suicides during 1995 to 2004".

Why India's growth model is skewed against agriculture?

It is not difficult to understand why India's structural transformation in the reform (post-liberalised) era took an unusual trajectory.

In 2013, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) published a report "Agriculture and Structural Transformation in Developing Asia: Review and Outlook" analysing the growth stories of Asian countries.

It said the most stylised factor in modern development was a secular decline in the share of agriculture in the economy with consequent rise in the combined shares of industry and services. Asia was no exception but, in its case, the share of agriculture in output was declining faster than that of employment.

Also read: Rebooting Economy 51: Where is India's vision, plan for sustained agriculture growth and farmers' welfare?

Even here, India is an outlier.

The report said "the most successful Asian economies" pursued "agricultural development-led industrialisation pathway" and gave examples: "The newly industrialised economies in East Asia (Japan; the Republic of Korea; and Taipei, China), followed an agriculture development-led industrialisation pathway. The fast-growing transition economies (the People's Republic of China and Vietnam) seem to be traversing a similar one. Agricultural growth has also been a prominent feature in the rest of developing Asia, particularly Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand."

It kept India outside the group of "successful transition economies" with this observation: "However, growth in agriculture has lagged in Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and the Philippines; in these countries, theperiod of rapid sustainable growth came late or has yet to materialise." It singled out India where "the absolute number of people employed in agriculture is still rising" even among countries with more than 50% employed in agriculture.

The study underlined that "growth in agriculture supports the subsequent growth of industry", not the other way round that India pursued. In the reform era, India ignored agriculture and promoted industry (manufacturing included) which has neither provided jobs nor added much to the GDP.

Former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, the architect of 1991 liberalisation, tried a course correction following a long spell of agrarian distress and farmers' suicide by setting up the National Commission on Farmers (NCF) in 2004, under MS Swaminathan who had played a key role in the Green Revolution. (Singh made several course corrections, to know more read, " Rebooting Economy 50: Economic reforms for whom and for what? ")

The commission produced five volumes of analysis and recommendations. Prof. Chand wrote (2017) that the expected shift in focus of policy and development strategy from increasing agricultural production to increasing farmers' welfare and income, or both, did not happen.

What did China do when it began reforms?

India has long competed with China for growth and failed and yet never learnt from its experience in agriculture.

Two agricultural economists, Prof. Shenggen Fan of the US's International Food Policy Research and his counterpart in India, Prof. Ashok Gulati, wrote a paper in EPW in 2018-"The Dragon and the Elephant: Learning from Agricultural and Rural Reforms in China and India", in 2008.

Three of the key points they highlighted were:

  • China made agriculture the starting point of its market-oriented reforms. This led to development of rural non-farm (RNF) sector and strengthened domestic production base for industrial growth. In contrast, India's reforms were non-agricultural.
  • China's first phase of agricultural reforms of 1978-84 reduced rural poverty from 33% to 15%. In contrast, India saw "the most rapid poverty reduction occurred from late 1960s and the late 1980s", a period "called Green Revolution". Agriculture was "not a major factor behind poverty reduction during the era of reforms".
  • China carried outland reform and distribution, as a result of which "landlessness is virtually absent" there. India failed and "left a relatively larger number of landless agricultural labourers exposed to the harsh impact of unemployment and underemployment". As per the 2011 Census, 55% of India's total agricultural workforce is landless.

Also Read: Rebooting Economy 49: Who needs corporates to run banks and how will it help Indian economy?

There are other lessons from China's growth story too.

China ensures its farmers get good price for their produce and got into trouble for this in 2019 when the WTO ruled against its high agricultural subsidy. Yes, China heavily subsidies its agriculture, far more than India.

Here is an eye-opener from a Washington Post report on the WTO development, which was written by Prof. Kristen Hopewell of the University of Edinburgh (March 4, 2019).

She wrote China was now the world's largest subsidiser of agriculture, providing $212 billion in farm subsidies in 2016, which was significantly more than the European Union ($100 billion) and the US ($33 billion). Its subsidies included "government purchases at above-market prices, as well as market price support programme, where farmers receive a direct payment from the government if market prices fall below a minimum set price".

Also Read: Rebooting Economy 48: Do tax numbers show a healthier economy?

The complaint against China was lodged by the US in 2016.

Interestingly, in 2013, the US Department of Agriculture report "Growth and Evolution in China's Agricultural Support Policies" wrote how the US benefitted from high farm subsidies of China.

It said: "In recent years, Chinese price supports and subsidies have risen at an accelerating pace after they were linked to rising production costs. Per-acre subsidy payments to grain producers now equal 7 to 15 percent of those producers' gross income... Chinese authorities began raising price supports annually to bolster incentives, and Chinese prices for major farm commodities are rising above world prices, helping to attract a surge of agricultural imports. US agricultural exports to China tripled in value during the period when China's agricultural support was accelerating."

In India, farmers are fighting for legal rights for MSP (price support) in trading with private companies and traders outside the regulated APMC mandis but the central government and a large number of agricultural economists are strongly opposing it, leading to a prolonged (more than 40 days) protest in the cold winter of Delhi, which has claimed at least 50 lives (some by suicide) so far.

Experts in India blame the MSP for rise in prices of agricultural produce over world price for harming trade, while the government's trade policies for farm produce are so whimsical that onion export was banned a day before the new farm law Essential Commodities (Amendment) Ordinance of 2020 was passed by the Parliament in September 2020, in gross violation of the conditions laid out in it for such intervention. (For more read "Rebooting Economy 51: Where is India's vision, plan for sustained agriculture growth and farmers' welfare?")

Also Read: Rebooting Economy 47: Do India's fiscal numbers suggest a quick turn-around?

There is yet another key lesson from China.

India invests very little in agriculture research and education (R&E), which Prof. Gulati claimed to have the "highest impact" on agri-GDP growth and poverty alleviation. He wrote, in 2019, that China spent $7.8 billion on agriculture knowledge, innovation, including agri-R&D, in 2018-19 - which was 5.6 times more than India's $1.4 billion.  

Further, India's investment in agriculture has seen a fall. Agriculture's share of gross capital formation (GCF) fell from 8.5% of the total GCF of economy in FY12 to 6.5% in FY19, mainly due to a fall in private investment - according to the Agricultural Statistics at a Glance, 2019.

What does all this tell about India's growth model and its neglect of agriculture?

Also Read: Rebooting Economy 46: Who is designing India's growth path?

Also Read: Rebooting Economy 45: What is AatmaNirbhar Bharat and where will it take India?


Rebooting Economy 55: Farmer producer organisations best bet for small, marginal farmers

 These organisations face multiple challenges ranging from low capital base, poor credit facility, lack of business know-how and skilled manpower but with government handholding they have the potential to change the fortunes of small and marginal farmers

twitter-logoPrasanna Mohanty | January 4, 2021 | Updated 00:08 IST
Rebooting Economy 55: Farmer producer organisations best bet for small, marginal farmers
It would take several years and more effort to make FPOs really work for small and marginal farmers

In the din over farmers' protest over new farm laws, a major initiative to raise farmers' income, especially the small and marginal ones, has been forgotten: Farmer Producer Organisations (FPOs).

The central government launched a new scheme "Formation and Promotion of Farmer Producer Organisations (FPOs)" on February 19, 2020 to set up 10,000 new FPOs with a budgetary support of Rs 6,865 crore from FY20 to FY28.

The objective is to provide small and marginal farmers "better collective strength for better access to quality input, technology, credit and better marketing access through economies of scale for better realisation of income".

The FPOs include farmer producer companies (FPCs) registered under the Companies Act as well as farmers' cooperatives registered under the Cooperative Societies Act of state governments. FPO is now defined as "farmer" in the new Farmers' Produce Trade and Commerce (Promotion and Facilitation) Act of 2020 for the purpose of trading in agricultural produce. Many FPOs are already engaged in public procurement from their member farmers (as in Madhya Pradesh).

Also Read: Rebooting Economy 53: Why crop insurance is losing traction in India

While farmers' cooperatives existed for long, FPCs emerged with the insertion of a new chapter "Producer Companies" (Part IXA) in the Companies Act of 1956 in 2003. FPCs combine the cooperative (collective) spirit and structural advantages of companies. It allows farmers to register a producer company to engage in production, harvesting, processing and marketing of agricultural produce.

Presently, there is no accurate information on FPOs or their members. Two central agencies promoting FPOs, Small Farmers' Agri-Business Consortium (SFAC) and National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD), have their separate lists as per which there are 5,116 (881 in SFAC list and 4,235 in NABARD list) FPOs. A NABARD paper of 2019, however, says that there are about 6,000 FPOs, of which about 3,200 are FPCs and the rest cooperatives.

A 2020 study by the Azim Premji University, "Farmer Producer Companies: Past, Present and Future", found 7,374 producer companies (FPCs) registered between January 1, 2003 and March 31, 2019 under the Companies Act, in which 4.3 million small farmers are members (shareholders). It says several farmers' cooperatives have now registered themselves as producer companies. Most of these companies are concentrated in Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Tamil Nadu and Uttar Pradesh.

The first challenge, therefore, is to set up a data base on FPOs in order to analyse, regulate and support them. Writing about the central government's new scheme, Nagendra Nath Sinha, secretary in the Rural Development Ministry, recently wrote in a national daily ("Cooperatives faltered, but FPOs must succeed") that 10,000 FPOs is a modest goal and that India needs more than 100,000 FPOs.

Also Read: Rebooting Economy 52: The unfinished agenda of land reforms nobody talks about

Advantages of FPOs for small and marginal farmers

A few studies have been carried out recently to assess their functioning and progress, one of which is by the Chandigarh-based Centre for Research in Rural and Industrial Development (CRRID), "Farmer Producer Organisations & Agri-marketing" published in April 2020. It looked at FPOs in Punjab (where they have not done so well) and Madhya Pradesh (where they have) and concluded that marginal and small farmers are the major beneficiaries of FPOs.

Prof. Satish Verma of the CRRID, who carried out the study, lists some of the benefits of FPOs: collective purchasing of quality inputs which lowers the cost of production, training in know-how, sharing of farm machinery, higher earnings through collective selling in market and/or to government agencies (MSP-based public procurement) and working as social enterprises driven by farmers' welfare and community development etc.

He lists two major reasons for poor growth and performance of FPOs in Punjab: individualist trait of Punjab farmers which makes it difficult for them to work as a cohesive group and vested market interests that do not want FPOs to get into public procurement activities.

Also read: Rebooting Economy 51: Where is India's vision, plan for sustained agriculture growth and farmers' welfare?

His study gives the example of a "mature" FPO (more than three-year-old) in Punjab which sold about 10% of the member farmers' produce (Dhira Patra FPO) while that of Madhya Pradesh (Narsingh FPO) sold 42.67%.

Madhya Pradesh was the first to promote FPOs under the District Poverty Initiative Programme (DPIP) during 2002-11, with the support of the World Bank. The state set up an umbrella organisation for FPOs in 2014, Madhya Bharat Consortium of Farmer Producers' Company Limited (MBCFPCL), in collaboration with the SFAC. The MBCFPCL is engaged in public procurement and allots quota to FPOs for procurement of food grains and pulses for government agencies.

Agriculture economists have long hoped that FPOs, the new generation cooperatives, would work to protect the interests of small and marginal farmers, in which traditional cooperatives have failed, except in some cases like the Amul in Gujarat.

Also Read: Rebooting Economy 50: Economic reforms for whom and for what?

Multiple challenges to FPOs' success

The Azim Premji University's 2020 study says well-run and stable FPOs have the potential to improve farmers' incomes and reduce their exposure to economic risks. But there are multiple challenges: small number of shareholders, low procurement volumes, sub-scale operations, limited value addition capabilities, poor marketing linkages, inability to attract talent and lack of strategic thinking and planning etc.

The NABARD, which has promoted the maximum number of FPOs (more than 4,000), published a paper "Farmer Producers' Organisations (FPOs): Status, Issues & Suggested Policy Reforms" in 2019 listing the challenges: lack of technical skill and awareness about the potential benefits from FPOs, lack of professional management, weak finances, inadequate access to institutional credit (banks doubt their ability to pay back, the members being mostly small and marginal farmers), inadequate access to markets and infrastructure etc.

The challenges are many but one that overshadows all others is financial constraint. That is why government assistance and prolonged handholding becomes critical.

Also Read: Rebooting Economy 49: Who needs corporates to run banks and how will it help Indian economy?

The NABARD's 2019 study says around 70-80% of FPO (including FPCs) members are small and marginal farmers and that membership ranges from 100 to 1,000. It is unrealistic to expect poor farmers to contribute large sums as share capital that would make FPO financially robust.

The Azim Premji University study points out that the average paid-up capital of FPOs ranges from a few thousand to several lakhs across states. Only 90 out of 6,926 active FPOs have paid-up capital of Rs 50 lakh or more, while 86% have less than Rs 10 lakh.

As for accessing credit from the market, Sinha writes that it is ironic that while agricultural loans are available at 7-9%, FPOs have to borrow largely from microfinance institutions (MFIs) at about 18% interest. The central government's new scheme does provide credit guarantee cover up to project loans of Rs 2 crore, but in his opinion more needs to be done, especially for working capital and lower interest rates.

Also Read: Rebooting Economy 48: Do tax numbers show a healthier economy?

Keeping these financial constraints in mind, some experts have argued that the government's handholding should be up to seven years to stabilise FPO operations.

Studies on FPOs/FPCs have made several suggestions, a large number of which relate to financial and professional help. The central government scheme seeks to address many of those. But it would take several years and more effort to make FPOs really work for small and marginal farmers.

Also Read: Rebooting Economy 47: Do India's fiscal numbers suggest a quick turn-around?

Also Read: Rebooting Economy 46: Who is designing India's growth path?

Rebooting Economy 70: The Bombay Plan and the concept of AatmaNirbhar Bharat

  The Bombay Plan, authored by the doyens of industry in 1944 first envisioned state planning, state ownership and control of industries to ...