PC in a pickle?

Is P Chidambaram getting too big for his boots? Or is it that the Congress wants to send a conflicting message to address to the concerns of various constituencies? Better still, is it a reflection of the perceived differences between the political boss, Sonia Gandhi and the executive boss, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh?

Knowing the Congress, you never know. It can be any of these or all of these at the same time.

For quite some time, an impression has gain ground that Chidambaram is the Shining Knight of the UPA, particularly because of the way he has transformed the home ministry and taken the Maoists head-on. He has won the confidence and approbation of the BJP chief ministers too, including that of Narendra Modi. When he offered to resign following the Dantewada massacre, the BJP stood up and appealed him to continue his battle against the insurgent. No mean achievement this given the fractious politics of the day.

All this would have certainly rattled many in the party, a monolith which seldom allowed anyone to grow too big if he happened to be from outside the dynasty. Recall how Pranab Mukherjee and V.P. Singh had been cut to size. And also how P.V. Narasimha Rao had a difficult time dealing with Arjun Singh and N.D.Tiwari. In the present context, Digvijay Singh is far too senior a party leader to be taken lightly. There may have been personal differences, as he mentions in his newspaper article, but for him to take a line completely different from that of the party-led government on the Maoist issue raises reasonable doubts about the purpose of his salvo. Singh wrote, among other things, that “he (Chidambaram) is treating it purely as a law and order problem without taking into consideration the issues that affect the tribals”. Another of his comment is also note worthy. In the same article he wrote: “We can’t solve this problem by ignoring the hopes and aspirations of the people living in these areas. Are these people getting benefits of public distribution system, MNREGA, NRHM and other pro-people policies? Are our forest policies, mining policies, land and water policies people-centric?”

Another senior leader, Mani Shankar Aiyar, too has jumped into the ring. He has been insisting for days together, particularly after the Dantewada massacre, that the only solution to the Maoist problem is implementation of the Panchayats (Extension to Scheduled Areas) Act. When Digvijay Singh’s article caused a ripple, he supported him whole-heartedly, saying the former Madhya Pradesh chief minister is “one lakh percent right”. Are they playing a familiar game? The game that Digvijay Singh played by visiting Azamgarh some time ago to raise the Batla House encounter issue?

Political observers are not unfamiliar with the strategy of the ruling party to let a section of its own to act as a critique of the government’s policies to appropriate the role of the opposition. The Swadeshi Jagaran Manch and the RSS often played that role during the NDA regime. By taking a line that sounds so much like that of the civil society protesting against the security operation against the Maoists, both Singh and Aiyar seem to be playing to a constituency which has every reason to feel alienated from the party and the government—the civil society and the tribals among whom the Maoists have found a support base.

But coming as it does after the prime minister’s clear directive that only the home ministry would be the authority to speak on the issue, their comments can’t be seen simply as an attempt to keep various constituencies happy. Not when far too many grapevines are actively whispering about a growing gulf between the political boss, and the executive boss ---be it over amending the RTI Act, the Food Security Bill or one’s focus on social agenda while the other one is busy pursuing his economic and foreign policy agenda.

Singh and Aiyar are far too astute and shrewd politicians to let one know their real motive. If there is a method to the disgruntled voices against the government, it can be discerned in due course of time.

The Gujjars are back

The Gujjars of Rajasthan are back in action. Their long march to lay a siege of Jaipur has begun. Another few days and the Rajasthan capital could well be cut off from all sides as the Gujjars are moving in from east, west and south in large numbers. This time, their demand is to “implement” what their earlier agitations had led to—5 percent reservation in educational institutes and government services.

Funny how nothing moves in the power corridor until an agitation is launched.

But you can’t blame the Gujjars. They tried to sort out the matter through dialogue. It didn’t work. It hadn’t worked in 2007 or 2008 either, when they were demanding to be classified as a Scheduled Tribe and be given reservation in educational institutes and government jobs. They also gave an advance warning about their agitation, just as they had done on earlier occasions. You can’t blame Col Kirori Singh Bainsla, their leader, for not being orderly or efficient.

The state government too has followed its tradition. It hasn’t implemented the reservation granted last year. In fact, the genesis of the Gujjar problem lies in failed promises.

Vasundhara Raje had promised during 2003 elections that if voted to power she will classify the Gujjars as the Scheduled Tribe and grant reservation. She did nothing for four years. The Gujjars launched their agitation in 2007 which led to a bloodbath. She made promises again only to deceive and provoke another agitation a year later. When she finally passed a law, she could only take the Gujjars out of the OBC category to classify them as “Special Backward Class” and reserved 5 percent seats for them in educational institutes and government services. But before the governor could give his consent, she was out.

The Congress government led by Ashok Gehlot took it further and notified the law in 2009. A year later, it has not implemented it because the court intervened.

The Rajasthan High Court stayed the implementation saying that the total reservation crossed 50 percent, a cut-off mark the Supreme Court has set and can’t be violated. The government could have done much after the stay came in January this year but it didn’t.

What will happen now? The government has two options—either plead its case against the apex court’s cut-off mark, saying that this should be waved off in the extraordinary conditions prevailing in the state or take the Gujjars back as the OBC. The first option would make it a long-drawn affair.

The Gujjars want the government to decide one way or the other. They are now so desperate they wouldn’t mind becoming OBC again. In fact, they have indicated that they would be happy being so if their quota remained fixed, within the 27 percent marked for the OBCs. They stand to gain immediately. The government needs to fill up a vacancy of 120,000 teachers in the state. After all, some reservation is better than none.

Funny how communities think reservation is the only way to progress.

Rules flouted but Ramesh has only “regret” to offer

April 14, 2010, Governance Now

Mining firms start using non-forest land while eco approval is pending

Ask Environment and Forests Minister Jairam Ramesh, the one who has taken up cudgels for the green cause, why his ministry has been flouting its own rules in letting mining activities in non-forest areas.

The answer: Ramesh regrets. Yes, that’s right. His PA said “the minister regrets”. Does it mean he will not answer the questions? “Yes,” said his PA.

On prodding, the aide said he had put up a set of questions from Governance Now before Ramesh. The minister sent it back with just one word scribbled on the paper: “Regrets”.

I had written to the minister on April 8: "I am in possession of two communications from your ministry to the Orissa government, asking the principal secretary/special secretary (forests) to allow construction activities and mining activities in non-forest land even while final approval for the forest part of the proposal is pending with your ministry. This is a clear violation of your ministry's guidelines. How are your officials violating the guidelines and asking the Orissa government to violate it too?

“One case pertains to Aditya Alumina Ltd regarding diversion of 119.264 hectare of forest land in Sambalpur district for establishing a smelter plant. The letter is dated January 6, 2010 and has been signed by BK Singh, senior assistant inspector general of forests.

“The second instance relates to Tata Steel, regarding lease for Katamati mines in Keonjhar district. The mining proposal is pending with the Orissa government, your ministry's letter of December 18, 2009 says. The letter then instructs the special secretary (forests) that 'the mining may be allowed in non-forest land as per the map submitted with above mentioned diversion purpose". This letter too has been signed by BK Singh. It goes on to say Tatas' working is restricted to non-forest land since 1983.

“The third case relates to French multinational Lafarge's mining operations in Meghalaya – the matter is pending with the Supreme Court now. My question is what action you have taken against the officials who certified the mining area as 'rocky region' without any possibility of natural growth of forest in the Rapid Environment Impact Assessment Report of April 2000, on the basis of which mining was allowed. Later, the regional MoEF office in its letter of June 1, 2006 said the mining area is 'found surrounded by thick natural vegetation cover'. And what steps have you taken to prevent such ghastly acts by your officials?”

The minister himself has been at pains to explain the guidelines regarding the Forest (Conservation) Act of 1980, which says “that when a project involves both non-forest and forest lands, construction in the non-forest land should not begin without clearance for activity in the forest land itself.”

See attachments below for MoEF's letters flouting its own guidelines and asking Orissa government to do so.

Telangana: Politics sans commonsense

Feb 2010

Telangana has been on the boil for most part of the month. Students’ agitation and bandhs, often accompanied by violence, have crippled life in the region and brought the entire state machinery to a standstill. The council of ministers can’t meet because earlier the ministers belonging to Rayalseema and Coastal Andhra kept away protesting against the Centre’s go-ahead to the statehood for Telangana and then, when the Centre retracted its statement, those belonging to Telangana put in their papers. There are no indications that things would improve in a hurry.

Though the Centre has called a meeting with all political parties of Andhra Pradesh next week to arrive at a consensus, it has to be squarely blamed for creating the mess in the first place. Political prevarications that saw the UPA changing its stand on statehood time and again endures. That is the worrying part.

Is the Centre for smaller state? We don’t know. The Congress, which leads the UPA government, has kept changing its position. In 2004, it suited the party’s interest and hence it promised statehood for Telangana and forged an electoral alliance with the Telangana Rashtriya Samiti. But after forming the government, the Congress went back on its stand. It woke up to promise statehood again when the news came that TRS chief K Chandrasekhar Rao, who was on fast to press for statehood, was critical. When it evoked a strong protest, even from Congress’ own legislators, the government decided to put the statehood on hold and began a consultation process.

It is not difficult to resolve the issue. All it requires is to stop the politics of deception. It is easy to see why smaller states are eminently desirable. All statehood demands in recent past have emerged for economic reasons. When people started agitating for Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh and Uttarakhand, their main grouse was gross lack of development in those regions. After the statehood was granted, these new states have shown remarkable progress. Their GDP has grown at a much faster rate. The annual growth rate for the past five years is much better than rest of the country—9.3% for Uttarakhand, 8.45% for Jharkhand and 7.3% for Chhattisgarh.) These were once part of Bimaru states. There is no reason to believe that the situation would be any different if Telangana gets statehood.

It makes political sense too. Political stability may have eluded Jharkhand but people of the region feel more empowered. They are playing a direct role in forming their governments. Earlier, they voted for parties and candidates and waited for political machinations in Patna, a faraway place, to see who formed the government. They could only hope for more representation in the council of ministers so that projects and programmes benefitting them could be pushed harder. No more. Same is with Chhattisgarh and Uttarakhand. You don’t hear people grumbling and complaining of neglect. They stand to gain more by way of development work and employment opportunity. When Jharkhand was part of Bihar and the Subarnarekha dam project took off, most of the jobs meant for displaced people actually went to north Biharis. Such injustice is unthinkable now.

From administrative point of view too, smaller states make sense. Look at Chhattisgarh. It is still struggling to build roads, schools, hospitals, police stations and other infrastructure. Most of the Bastar region is devoid of all these. The government exists only in district towns and blocks. Some blocks are not even approachable. So long as the party in power in Bhopal did not feel threatened, nobody cared for a remote region like Chhattisgarh. The case of Telangana is no different.

Why does then the UPA government prevaricate on the statehood issue? It has begun consultation process for Telangana, but is steadfastly refusing to listen to those agitating for Gorkhaland. Irrespective of resolution of the Telangana issue, more and more demands for statehood would start. More agitation would mean more disruption, loss of life and loss of public assets. Commonsense would tell that the simple way to tackle the clamour for statehood would be to set up a new State Reorganisation Commission and implement its recommendation. But then, who says commonsense makes sound politics!

Postcards from the Republic of Hunger

March 29, 2010, Governance Now

People of Balangir district of the infamous KBK region of Odisha want food, not government schemes to provide food

Starvation deaths and Orissa have become synonymous. It does not raise eyebrows anymore. Nobody loses sleep over them, least of all the local administration. A series of reports has appeared in a national daily pointing out that about 50 people have perished to hunger in Balangir (one of the three districts infamous as KBK, along with Korapur and Kalahandi) alone in the past two to three years. Not even a perfunctory inquiry has been ordered. The local media has, more or less, ignored the tragedy. If at all, the issue is being debated by civil society groups but the bone of contention is that the figure might be exaggerated. The state human rights commission has made a bold move to visit the affected areas but its report will take some time.

A quarter of a century ago, when starvation deaths first shook the nation’s conscience, big plans were made and a lot of money was pumped in to provide food and reduce poverty in the KBK region. A long-term action plan (LTAP) was made, which was then rechristened with some modification as a Revised LTAP plan. Then came the Biju KBK plan. The KBK districts were reconstituted into eight districts to improve administration. All that planning is meaningless now because all that has been done on paper. There is nothing on the ground to show.

The KBK region continues to languish in poverty, particularly Balangir. A huge chunk of population migrates out every year in search of work. Though there are no official records, civil society groups put the figure at 100,000 (of a total population of about 15 lakh). Most of them go to Andhra Pradesh to work at brick kilns. They go half-fed, suffer from various diseases because of poor nutrition and die young. According to Umi Daniel of a non-governmental agency, Aide et Action, South Asia, who studies problems of migration and related issues, the average life expectancy of the migrants is 40 years.

The government has various schemes to ensure that nobody goes hungry. Subsidised ration is provided to BPL and APL families. Then there are ICDS, mid-day meal scheme, Antyodyaya Anna Yojana and Annapurna Yojana to take care of the needy. But a large number of these migrants, who qualify as BPL families, don’t get any benefit. The BPL list has not been updated since 1997. No BPL also means they are denied other benefits like pension for widows (one has to fill in the BPL card number in the form), Indira Awas Yojana and other such schemes. The food-for-work carried out under the KBK plan has been discontinued. Work under NREGS is hard to come by because the average number of days of work is less than half the mandatory 100 days. And since the migrant families are mostly landless and the state has poor irrigation facilities, it is that much harder for them to work in the fields as farm labourers. Months leading to the monsoon are, therefore, the toughest to survive.

The central government may be working towards a right to food bill but these migrants of Balangir are doomed to die young--to disease and starvation, thanks to an inept government and years of negligence and absence of alternative sources of employment.

How to deal with the Maoists

Going by the surfeit of articles in the newspapers and magazines, debates in television studios or in various forums outside it seems the Maoist issue is far too complicated. Quite apparently, there is lack of clarity and consensus-- among politicians, governments, civil society groups and consequently, among ordinary people—over several fundamental aspects of the issue. Using this lack of clarity and consensus, many are arguing against use of the security forces against the Maoists. Do they really have a case? Let us examine.

First, the fundamental aspects that need clarity and consensus. It begins at the beginning: Who is a Maoist and what does he want? People like Arundhati Roy equate tribals with the Maoists to assert that the security operation against the Maoists is actually a “war against people”, it is “genocide”. And that the tribals, who are the Maoists, are actually fighting for their survival—their exploitation and displacement because of the minerals that the forests and mountains they live in carry and the years of apathy towards development of their area—the tribal heartland.

From this flows the second aspect—whether the government’s strategy of using security forces to fight the Maoists is justified. Those who argue against it say it is akin to the atrocities inflicted by the colonial power during the struggle for our independence or the Vietnam War or the crisis inflicted on Latin American countries in 80s and 90s by the developed world etc. It has also been described as a “witch-hunt” and a war on behalf of the corporate entities with which the state governments have signed MoUs to set up mining operations and industries in the mineral-rich tribal heartland of India. Arundhati Roy says Maoist Corridor is actually Mou-ist Corridor.

Its sub-text is use of violence as a weapon. Is the state justified in indulging in violence? Are the Maoists justified in indulging in violence? Since violence can’t be justified in the land of Gandhi, shouldn’t the government and the Maoists then hold peace talks and find a way out?

The third fundamental aspect involves addressing the “root cause”—lack of development in the tribal heartland and exploitation of the tribals—not identifying the “root cause” itself because that has been settled. The problem is how to go about it--whether development should be carried out in tandem with the security operation, before it or after it. This is a cause of bigger worry because even those who have no doubts about the “real” identity of the Maoist or what he wants and agree with the government’s strategy of using forces are divided on the question of tackling the root cause. “Develop and the problem of insurgency will disappear on its own” goes the argument.

Are any of the questions really weighty enough to stop the security operation against the Maoists? Who is a Maoist? The answer is really simple: the one who believes in the Maoist ideology. And what is the Maoist ideology? Read their Party Constitution, ratified and adopted in 2004 when the CPI(ML)PWG and MCCI merged and formed the entity Communist Party of India (Maoist), to find the answer. Members of this outfit, CPI(Maoist), are called Maoists in common parlance.

Chapter 1 of the Party Constitution, titled “General Programme”, says: “The Communist Party of India (Maoist) is the consolidated political vanguard of the Indian proletariat. Marxism-Leninism-Maoism is the ideological basis guiding its thinking in all the spheres of its activities. Immediate aim or programme of the Communist Party is to carry on and complete the New Democratic Revolution in India as a part of the world proletarian revolution by overthrowing the semi-colonial, semi-feudal system under the neo-colonial form of indirect rule, exploitation and control and the three targets of our revolution—imperialism, feudalism and comprador big bourgeoise.

“The ultimate aim or maximum programme of the party is the establishment of communist society. This New Democratic Revolution will be carried out and completed through armed agrarian revolutionary war, i.e., the Protracted People’s War with area-wise seizure of power remaining as its central task. Encircling the cities from the countryside and thereby finally capturing them will carry out the Protracted People’s War.”

It is quite clear what a Maoist wants. He wants to overthrow the government and capture political power through protracted armed struggle. What would any state do when an armed struggle is launched to overthrow it and capture political power?

As far as the tribal being Maoist, this ambiguity is created by people like Arundhati Roy. Many Maoists are indeed tribals but not all—for example, Mupalla Lakhmana Rao alias Ganapathy and Koteshwar Rao alias Kishenji are not tribals. Similarly, many tribals are Maoists but not all—for example, the Kondhs of Niyamgiri and hundreds of thousands who revolted against the Maoists in Chhattisgarh (Salwa Judum) and Gadchiroli (Gaonbandi) and many others who live in and outside the Red Corridor are not Maoists.

Tribals are mere pawns in that war. Farmers were pawns in Naxalbari. In Bihar, the SCs and OBCs continue to be pawns. The objective of Maoists has been clearly spelt out in their constitution.

How do you target the Maoists? It may be difficult to isolate and identify the Maoist militia, People’s Liberation Guerilla Army (PLGA), that has been set up to fight the Protracted People’s War when they are not carrying weapons, but not when they move around in jungles “in single files” as Arundhati Roy so graphically described in her account of the “embedded” journalistic expedition or when they attack the CRPF contingent in Dantewada or the Easter Frontier Rifles camp in Silda.

Now, coming to the question of whether the government is justified in using force. Once the purpose of the Maoists is understood--to capture political power through armed struggle--there is no scope for ambiguity. Violence is intrinsic and essential to such a protracted war. If ever there is any doubt, the Maoists dispelled that by butchering CRPF personnel in Dantewada, EFR contingent in Silda and beheading of Inspector Induwar, just to give a few recent examples.

The option of peace talk is always there but it doesn’t fit in the constitutional framework of the Maoists. It can only be a short-term strategy to re-group and re-work their strategy. The 2004 exercise in Andhra Pradesh reflected that. Kishenji’s 72-day ceasefire offer, which started from February 25 and is to end on May 7, during which CRPF personnel were massacred in Malkangiri and Dantewada and threat emails issued to Orissa chief minister, demonstrates its true worth.

That leaves issues relating to development--should it be in tandem, before or after the security operation. The doubts will clear once it is realized that development has been an issue ever since we gained independence. The battle against poverty, exploitation, lack of development continues and it is nobody’s case that it shouldn’t happen faster and equitably. The problem is, and has been, that it is a slow process and it would be self-defeating to wait for it to happen before starting the security operation against the Maoists.

Besides, how does the state develop an area not under its control? Most of the Dandakaranya, spread over Chhattisgarh, Orissa, Andhra Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh, is under the Maoists’ control. In Malkangiri district town, the city roads can’t be repaired for ages because no contractor comes forward because of Maoists threat. Arundhati Roy travelled with the Maoists for days but didn’t realize, some areas of Dandakaranya have been completely cut off from the civilized world—like Abujhmarh or Konta block of Dantewada where the CRPF personnel were butchered. No road exists. Those that do have thousand cuts and can easily be land-mined. Government officials are killed if they dare to enter, except for those whose movement is essential for the Maoists’ survival like PDS or medicine.

As far as issues like exploitation of tribals, their displacement, giving them no stake in the development activities in their areas etc are concerned, these are larger issues that need a policy re-think and need not detain the security operation against the Maoists.

The way forward is, therefore, quite clear. The short-term goal of the government should be to target and neutralize the armed wing of the Maoists, which calls for a comprehensive strategy so that it can be achieved with minimum collateral damage.

Development has to be a long-term goal.