Tuesday, December 10, 2019

Recession Reality Check II: Do quarterly GDP, other indicators reflect the true state of economy?

he second and concluding part looks at how the quarterly GDP estimates use the organised sector indicators to measure the unorganised sector, which contributes nearly 50% to the GDP, thereby giving a misleading picture of the state of economic health

twitter-logo Prasanna Mohanty   New Delhi     Last Updated: December 9, 2019  | 14:03 IST
Recession Reality Check: Do quarterly GDP, other indicators reflect the true state of economy?
FM Sitharaman said that the Indian economy is not in recession yet

Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman recently asserted in the Parliament that the Indian economy is not in recession yet, but the debate over the subject continues. This is primarily because the National Statistical Office (NSO) uses the organised sector data to measure growth in the unorganised sector also, which contributes substantially to the GDP, and assumes that both the sectors are growing at the same rate.
For a quick recall, the latest NSO data shows quarterly GDP growth falling for the sixth consecutive quarter - from a high of 8.1% in Q4 of FY18 to 4.5% in the last quarter (Q2 of FY20).
How the quarterly GDP is estimated
The NSO's statement announcing the GDP growth rate for Q2 of FY20 (and indeed all such quarterly statements released earlier), reveals its source of data for estimating the quarterly GDP.
While the agriculture sector data is collected from states for the quarterly estimates, for the non-agriculture sectors like industry and services, it uses the following data: (a) IIP Manufacturing data for the quasi-corporate and unorganised segment of manufacturing (b) corporate sector and banking data for financial, real estate and professional services (c) GST and sales tax for trade, hotel, transport, communication and broadcasting (d) IIP Electricity for electricity, gas, water supply and other utility services (e) production of cement and consumption of finished steel for construction etc.
Quite clearly then, the data sources are all from the organised sector. So, the quarterly GDP estimate would be accurate if both the organised and unorganised sectors are growing at the same rate. Indeed, Pronab Sen, economist and statistician who oversaw the 2011-12 re-basing of GDP as chairman of the National Statistical Commission (NSC) and his successor PC Mohanan confirm that the growth rate of the organised sector is taken for that of the unorganised sector also in the quarterly estimates.
But this could present a misleading picture if both are not growing at the same rate and the error would depend on the size and share of the unorganised sector in the GDP.
How big is the share of unorganised sector in GDP?
There is no official word on what the NSC does while estimating quarterly GDP. Way back in 2012, the NSC's Report of the Committee on Unorganised Sector Statistics of 2012 said this about the unorganised sector: More than 90% of workforce and about 50% of the national product (GDP) are accounted for by the informal economy.
An earlier official report, the National Commission for Enterprises in the Unorganised Sector (NCEUS)'s Contribution of the Unorganised sector to GDP: Report of the Sub Committee of a NCEUS Task Force, 2008, said the share of the unorganised sector (to GVA) was "55.24% in 1999-2000 and 49.9% in 2004-05".
Another indication of it could be what the Economic Survey of 2018-19, released on July 4, 2019, says about the workforce. It says "almost 93%" of the total workforce is "the informal workforce".
Sen says during the 2011-12 re-basing of the GDP series, the contribution of the unorganised sector was taken to be 47%.
Thus, it can be safely assumed that the unorganised sector contributes nearly 50% to the GDP.
This would mean that the quarterly GDP estimate could be off the mark by a big margin if both the sectors are not growing at the same rate.
Are the organised and unorganised sectors growing at the same rate?
There are no official data yet to show what has been the impact of demonetisation or GST on the unorganised sector but there is no disputing now that on these events did impact the economy adversely.
Sen says these developments impacted the unorganised sector more than the organised sector - demonetisation to a greater extent and GST to lesser. Assuming that these would have slowed down the unorganised sector's growth, he says, "Until now the GDP estimates are overstated since 2017-18".
He provides a back-of-the-envelope calculation to show the impact of different rates of growth for the organised and unorganised on the GDP estimates.
He says, of the 47% contribution of the unorganised sector to the GDP (as assumed during the finalisation of the 2011-12 GDP series), agriculture accounted for 17%, trade for 9% and the rest 21% by the manufacturing and services sectors. While the government collects agriculture related data from states and the trade data is available through GST, it is the rest 21% (unorganised manufacturing and services) which go unrepresented by actual data.
"This 21% is not really measured while estimating quarterly GDP", he asserts, adding, "We have no idea about what happened to 21% of the GDP" post-demonetisation and GST. Moreover, the quarterly GDP estimates are "even worse" since full data is not available even for the organised sector on a quarterly basis.
Economist Prof Arun Kumar has a different view.
He says transporters, traders, manufacturing associations etc. have been claiming a fall of 15% in business due to "three economic shocks" in quick succession - demonetisation, GST and the crisis in the non-banking financial companies (NBFCs). (News reports suggest a muted business even during the last festive season (Dussehra and Diwali) for consumer durables and retail - 15-20% business surge in sale against 27% last year - and 8-9% growth in ad spends, against 13-14%)
Even if a 10% fall in business in the unorganised sector is taken, Prof Kumar says, this would mean a negative (minus) 3.1% growth for the unorganised sector - assuming that 45% as the share of the unorganised sector in GDP, out of which agriculture accounts for 14% and gets reflected by the quarterly estimates, leaving the rest 31% of the non-agriculture sectors, including trade, unaccounted for.
Now that the organised sector (assuming its share to be 55%) is growing quarterly at 4.5%, this would mean its contribution to the quarterly GDP is only 2.4% (55% of 4.5%). Deducting negative (minus) 3.1% growth in the unorganised sector would then mean a net negative (minus) quarterly growth of 0.4%. "So, we are in a recession", he asserts.  
(For 2018-19, the share of agriculture to GDP was 14.38%, manufacturing 18.04% (industry 23.13%) and services 62.5%)
Prof Kumar also assumes that the unorganised sector trade is not captured by the GST collection, or would be too insignificant because: (a) those below aggregate turnover of Rs 40 lakh are exempt (b) for those with turnover of Rs 40 lakh to Rs 1.5 crore pay 1% tax under the composition scheme and (c) and as former Finance Minister Arun Jaitley had said, 95% of tax comes from only 4 lakh assesses, which is about 3%.
Mohanan, who worked as the NSC chairman until early this year, says: "My take is that the quarterly GDPs are not based on actual data except in very few cases. These are mostly based on indicators for the organised sector which are used for the unorganised sector applying the same growth rate. One good example of this clear mismatch is how the quarterly GDP went up after the demonetisation when everybody knew the economy was not doing so well. So, the quality of the quarterly GDP has its own limitations."
If the quarterly GDP numbers are misleading, so could be the other economic indicators linked to it that are used for assessing recession - per capita GDP (output or product), per capita gross and net national income (GNI and NNI), private consumption (PFCE) and capital formation (GFCF).
There is more to it.
Labour force is shrinking
The 2017-18 Periodic Labour Force Survey (PLFS) - which was held up for six months in spite of Mohanan's resignation earlier this year - showed that not only the unemployment rate had hit 45-year high at 6.1%, but a far bigger crisis was brewing in the economy.
It showed the labour force participation rate (LFPR) - those 15 years or above either working or looking for work - went down from 55.9% in 2011-12 to 49.8% in 2017-18 for the first time in India. What a fall in LFPR shows is that people are going out of the workforce because of lack of work.
Analysing the PLFS 2017-18 report, a study by the Azim Premiji University said in November this year that for the first time in India's history 9 million jobs were lost between 2011-12 (previous survey) and 2017-18.
It should be kept in mind that in 2017-18, India grew at an annual rate of 7.2%. Now that the growth rate has fallen to 4.5%, the unemployment situation could be far worse, and so the financial health of a large population, especially in rural areas.
Poverty is spreading for the first time
The NSO's Consumer Expenditure Survey (CES) of 2017-18 was junked by the government recently by raising questions about its data quality - after a leaked report painted a very grim picture. The leaked report showed that the "real" (inflation adjusted) household consumer expenditure had fallen in for the first time over 40 years in India by 3.7% - from Rs 1,501 in 2011-12 to Rs 1,446 in 2017-18.
Again, India was growing at 7.2% annually that year. Surely, the situation would be far worse at a 4.5% growth rate. In fact, that is the point Prof Kumar makes to strengthen his argument that India could very well be in a recession now.
That may not be the case and in absence of official data, a debate over recession could be a futile exercise but it would be self-defeating to ignore the warning signs and the gross limitations in the quarterly GDP estimations to reflect the real state of the economy.

Recession Reality Check I: Not recession yet but Indian economy isn't far from it either

All the key economic indicators have been on a downward swing for quite some time. If this slide is not checked India may slip into recession sooner than later. In this first part of a two-part series, the article looks at what the major economic indicators are telling about the state of Indian economy

twitter-logo Prasanna Mohanty   New Delhi     Last Updated: December 4, 2019  | 20:34 IST
Recession Reality Check: Not recession yet but Indian economy isn't far from it either
Union Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman
Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman made a dramatic statement at the Rajya Sabha on November 27: If you are looking at the economy with a discerning view, you see that growth may have come down but it is not a recession yet, it will not be a recession ever.
Two days later, the National Statistical Office (NSO) released the GDP estimates for the Q2 of FY20 showing a sixth straight fall in the quarterly GDP growth - from 8.1% in Q4 of FY18 to 4.5% for Q2 FY20 - as shown in the graph below.
How the world measures recession
India does not have its own norms or standards for identifying and declaring recession, says Pronab Sen, economist and statistician who supervised the finalisation of the 2011-12 GDP series as chairman of the National Statistical Commission (NSC).
The globally accepted definition of recession comes from the US' National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) which says, "A recession is a significant decline in economic activity spread across the economy, lasting more than a few months, normally visible in real GDP, real income, employment, industrial production, and wholesale-retail sales."
The UK and the European Union accept the following definition: The commonly accepted definition of a recession in the UK is two or more consecutive quarters (a period of three months) of contraction in national GDP.
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) evolved its own measure during 2008-09 global financial melt-down in its World Economic Outlook - April 2009: Crisis and Recovery the approach of which is to look at decline indicators such as "real GDP per capita, industrial production, trade, capital flows, oil consumption and unemployment".
Sen says the words 'decline' or 'contraction' used in the above definitions stand for "negative" growth rate. Since India's quarterly growth is a "plus" 4.5%, the Indian economy is not in a recession, he declares.
How does the Indian economy look if all the economic indicators mentioned in connection with recession are examined?
Here is a reality check:
(a) Growth in per capita income and product
What does growth in per capita GDP and per capita gross and net national income (GNI & NNI) look like? India does not publish quarterly but annual growth rates for these indicators and here is what those data show.
All three indicators have steadily fallen since FY16 for which data is readily available, except for the per capita GNI which went up in FY18 before going down again.
(b) Growth in private consumption
Consumption has been the mainstay of India's GDP growth for decades. The RBI's 2018-19 annual report shows the share of consumption was 71.5% of the GDP during FY12-FY14, which fell to 69.8% during FY15-FY19.
Its main component, private final consumption expenditure (PFCE) fell significantly from 66.2% of the GDP during FY12-FY14 to 57.5% in FY15-FY19, indicating a slowdown in demand. The other component, government final consumption expenditure (GFCE) contributed 5.3% and 12.3% of the GDP during the corresponding periods.
The latest data show the quarterly growth in PFCE coming down from 9.8% in Q2 FY19 to 5.1% in Q2 (contributing 56.3% to the GDP in Q2 of FY20).
This is a marked decline from 9.8% in Q2 of FY19 and 13.4% in Q3 of FY17.
The GFCE, on the other hand, shows improvement from 8.8% in Q1 FY20 to 15.6% in Q2 (contributing 13.1% to the GDP in Q2 FY20).
(b1) Growth in oil consumption
Consumption of petroleum products - a high-frequency data released on a monthly basis by the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas - is a good measure of economy too. Here is what the quarterly growth in volume (taking average of three months of a quarter as the quarterly value and then calculating growth rate from the corresponding quarter of the previous year) looks.
As the graph below shows the growth rate has fallen to 2.2% in Q2 of FY20.
(c) Growth in bank credit to non-food sector
The RBI provides monthly and annual bank credit to non-food sector, which includes monthly and annual credit outstanding to all sectors - agriculture and allied, small, medium and large industries and services and personal loans.
Using monthly data for measuring quarterly growth (using the method mentioned earlier) shows a declining trend since Q3 of FY19.
The annual growth rate, however, shows a starker reality - credit outstanding falling from a high of 20.7% in FY11 to 8.4% in FY18 and then improving to 12.3% in FY19.
(c1) Growth in capital formation (GFCF)
Gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) shows investment in an economy. The NSO data shows the quarterly growth in GFCF tapering off in recent quarters.
(d) Growth in industrial production (IIP)
The Index of Industrial Production (IIP), which measures industrial production - mining and quarrying having a weightage of 14.4%, manufacturing 77.6% and electricity 7.9% in the IIP under 2011-12 series - is another high frequency data available on a monthly basis.
The following graph shows quarterly growth rate in the IIP General Index (which includes all the components of industry) but using a simple moving average method in which the average of three months in a quarter is taken as the quarterly value and mapping growth in each quarter without year-on-year calculation.
The growth rate has fallen for several quarters, but showed signs of improvement in Q2 of FY20.
The monthly growth rate, however, presents a starker picture.
Business Today had earlier shown that the manufacturing IIP, which contributes 77.6% to the IIP, was growing at a much higher rate earlier - at a simple annual average of 10% between FY05 and FY11 (base 2004-05) - but had fallen to just 4% of simple annual average growth rate between FY12 and FY19 (base 2011-12).
(e) Growth in Electricity IIP
Electricity generation (weightage of 7.99% in IIP in 2011-12 series) is taken as a good indicator of the economic performance. This is also high-frequency data, available on a monthly basis.
This is what the latest Department for Promotion of Industry & Internal Trade (DPIIT)'s October 2019 statement shows. It has gone down to (minus) 12.4% in October 2019 - steadily falling since June 2019 when it registered a high growth of 8.6%. This is an alarming situation, reflecting poor economic activities.
(f) Growth in unemployment
The only significant macroeconomic indicator showing a positive trend is unemployment.
The Mumbai-based business information company CMIE carries out monthly survey of the state of employment (with a sample size of over 1.5 lakh households - bigger than the NSSO sample size) which shows, when plotted for quarterly movement (simple moving average for a quarter), the unemployment rate is growing since Q2 of FY18, reaching 7.6% in Q2 of FY20.
Latest monthly data of the CMIE shows an unemployment rate of 7.48% in November - down from 8.45% in October 2019. But the labour force participation rate (LFPR) - which reflects how many of the labour force (those either working or looking for work) are employed - fell to a new low of just 42.37%.
It may be pointed out that the Periodic Labour Force Survey (PLFS) of 2017-18 - which was withheld for six months until the 2019 general elections were over - showed a 45-year high unemployment rate of 6.1% and the LFPR falling from 55.9% in 2011-12 to 49.8% in 2017-18. This means, for the first time in India's history, more than 50% of the working age population was out of the job market because there were not enough jobs to look for.
Not far from recession
Growth in all the major economic indicators shown in the earlier paragraphs clearly indicates that India is not yet in a recession but the rapid downwards movement is a warning for the policy makers: If the decline continues at this rate the days of recession are not far away - when the quarterly GDP growth actually hits the negative zone.
But this is only a part of the story of India's economy.
(Part II of this article would look at how truly the quarterly GDP and other economic indicators are capturing the real state of Indian economy)

Reality Check Part VI: Stress in NBFCs shows no sign of abating

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Rules of 2019 would help but more needs to be done: tighter RBI control and supervision, infusion of long-term funds (including capital) and reduction in mismatch in assets and liabilities

twitter-logo Prasanna Mohanty        Last Updated: December 1, 2019  | 21:44 IST
Reality Check: Stress in NBFCs shows no sign of abating
The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Rules 2019 were notified on November 15, bringing non-banking financial service providers into the ambit of the insolvency and liquidation proceedings (IBC Code)

Rakesh Wadhawan and his son Sarang have not only spelt disaster for the 16 lakh depositors of Punjab and Maharashtra Co-operative Bank (PMC), who had 73% loan exposure to their real estate company Housing Development & Infrastructure Ltd (HDIL) now undergoing insolvency proceedings, but also jeopardise other public depositors and banks.
That is because the Dewan Housing Finance Corporation Ltd (DHFL), a deposit-taking non-banking financial company (NBFC-D) they promoted, has become the first one in the shadow banking sector to be taken over by the RBI (on November 20) for initiating insolvency proceedings under the new Insolvency and Bankruptcy Rules of 2019 notified on November 15. The DHFL's outstanding dues are reported to be Rs 76,000 crore.
RBI on an NBFC de-registration binge: 56 in Aug, Sept and Oct
But the fall of DHFL maybe the proverbial tip of the iceberg in the shadow banking sector - second to the banking sector in lending with a size of 15% of the scheduled commercial banks' (SCBs) combined balance sheet (loans or advances); the urban co-operative banks' (UCBs) being the third with 11% of that of the SCBs'.
The RBI's latest reports paint a dismal picture.
On November 15, 2019, the RBI issued a notification cancelling "certificate of registration (CoR)" of 25 NBFCs, declaring that those "shall not transact the business of a Non-Banking Financial Institution". The same day, it had de-registered another 5 which had surrendered their registrations.
A fortnight earlier on September 30, it had issued another notification de-registering 26 more NBFCs. Most of these NBFCs are located in Delhi/New Delhi, with a few in Assam, West Bengal, Punjab and Uttar Pradesh. All the 56 de-registrations happened in the months of August, September and October.
The RBI notifications don't give reasons for de-registration or surrender of registrations, nor indicate what would be the impact on depositors or banks.
In its latest 'Report on Trends and Progress of Banking in India 2017-18', the RBI throws light on how serious the problem is. It says, on page 118: "At the end of September 2018, the number of
NBFCs registered with the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) declined to 10,190 from 11,402 at the end of Mach 2018" - that is, a decline of 1,210 NBFCs in six months or at a rate of 202 a month or about 7 (6.7) every single day.
It then explains the reason: "NBFCs are required to have a minimum net owned fund (NOF) of ?20 million (Rs 2 crore). In a proactive measure to ensure strict compliance with the regulatory guidelines, the Reserve Bank cancelled the Certificates of Registration (CoR) of NBFCs not meeting this criterion."
A minimum NOF - net worth of a finance company - of Rs 2 crore for registration with the RBI was set in April 1999 (up from Rs 25 lakh earlier). Of the 56 NBFCs which were de-registered in August, September and October, 14 had been registered before April 1999. This would indicate that all these NBFCs fell below the NOF thresh-hold in recent months.
Such a high failure rate raises a serious question that calls for the answer: Does it indicate a crisis building up in the economy adversely impacting the NBFC sector? The RBI reports don't explain.
More NBFCs getting de-registered since FY16
The RBI's 2018 report on the banking trends provides a graph (on page 119) which shows more NBFCs are getting de-registered than registered since FY16.
Does this indicate that the crisis in the economy has been building up since FY16?
This graph presents an anomaly though. It shows that the net decline in NBFCs during April-September 2018 was just 790 (900 minus 110) - not 1,210 as the previous page had stated. What happened to the rest 420 (1,210 minus 790) is a mystery.
Rise in GNPA ratio in NBFC sector
The RBI's Financial Stability Report of June 2019 shows that the stress assets in the NBFCs, measured in terms of GNPA ratio, increased from 5.8% in FY18 to 6.6% in FY19. The GNPAs has witnessed steady growth since FY15 when it was 4.1%.
The NNPA ratio (net NPA to net advances), however, declined marginally from 3.8% in FY18 to 3.7% in FY19 and the capital to risk-weighted assets ratio (CRAR) moderated to 19.3% in FY19 from 22.8% in FY18 - yet remaining higher than the prescribed limit of 15%, reflecting the financial soundness of the sector.
This gives a mixed-signal about the state of NBFCs in the absence of explanations.
Stress in NBFCs spreading, raising questions about RBI's supervision
The crisis in NBFCs sprang to light last year when the IL&FS - a major lender in the infrastructure and financial services with a debt of Rs 91,000 crore, out of which Rs 57,000 crore are bank loans defaulted and the government superseded its management in October 2018. The case is now pending before the national company law tribunal (NCLT).
The IL&FS is one of the Systematically non-deposit taking NBFCs (NBFCs-ND-SI) - which constitutes 84.8% of the total assets of the NBFC sector, the rest 15.2% being held by the deposit-taking NBFCs (NBFCs-D). Since the NFBCs-ND-SI are non-deposit taking (not allowed public deposits), their major sources of funds are bank loans and debentures. These are the ones with more than Rs 500 crore in asset size and pose "greater systemic risks" and hence, are subjected to stricter RBI regulations.
The defaults by the DHFL followed this. News reports suggest several other NBFCs - the Reliance ADAG Group companies like Home Finance and Reliance Commercial Finance, Indiabulls Housing Finance, Edelweiss Financial Services and Piramal Capital - have now been downgraded in their ratings, indicating that the crisis in the sector is spreading.
More recently, the Karvy Stock Broking Ltd (KSBL), a premier financial service provider under, has client defaults worth Rs 2,000 crore. Its fully-owned subsidiary, Karvy Financial Services Limited (KFSL), received its NBFC licence in FY10.
All these developments raise more questions about the RBI's regulatory control over NBFCs.
Vishwas Utagi, the convenor of PMC bank depositors' association and former vice president of all India bank employees association (AIBEA), says since the RBI registers NBFCs and exercises supervisory powers, the current state of affairs does raise serious doubts about its functioning. In the IL&FS case, he says, it also reflects the RBI's failure to regulate credit rating agencies which gave high credit rating to it, thus facilitating bank lending.
Utagi also questions the central government's decision to step in and initiate insolvency proceedings for the IL&FS, which comes under the direct regulatory control of the RBI. He expresses serious reservations about the reported move to bail it out through the public sector entities like LIC and SBI. He says this would transfer private sector stress to the public sector, jeopardising the financial health of LIC and SBI.
Satish Marathe, director in the RBI's Central Board, however, insists that the RBI has been doing good work and the large number of de-registration of NBFCs reflects its persistence and due diligence over the years. Though he points out that the true extent of stress in the NBFC sector may not be known as there is no knowing how many DHFLs are out there, as yet.
Stress in NBFC hurting growth
The recent developments also indicate a bigger crisis gripping the economy.
NBFCs witnessed a strong credit expansion in FY18 and FY19 (up to September) while that of banks shrunk due to "rising non-performing assets (NPAs) and pervasive risk aversion", according to the RBI's 2018 banking trend report.
The regulator says retail loans of NBFCs grew at a robust 46.2% in FY18, up from 21.6% in FY17. This growth was driven in the vehicle loan segment in manufacturing and commercial real estate and retail trade in the services sector. It lists three reasons to explain this expansion: (a) slowdown in SCBs' credit (b) relative decline in NBFCs' cost of lending vis-a-vis banks and (c) increase in aggregate demand.
It particularly highlights the growth in lending to real estate "in view of a sharp deceleration in SCBs' credit to this sector". But following the implosion of IL&FS that set off a liquidity crunch in NBFCs, credit outflow to the real estate sector has shrunk. The DHFL and Altico Capital - both having major exposure to the real estate sector - have defaulted.
This phase is also marked by growth in bank lending to NBFCs. The RBI's FSR 2019 says bank borrowings to total borrowings (by NBFCs) increased from 21.2% in March 2017 to 23.6% in March 2018 and further to 29.2% in March 2019.
Taken together, this would indicate that while there may be demand in certain sectors of the economy, growth is hurt by the reluctance of the SCBs to lend, followed now by the resource crunch in NBFCs.
Marathe says the recent developments have hurt NBFCs' lending. The mismatch in assets and liabilities has become more pronounced after the IL&FS episode as scrutiny in the appraisal of NBFCs heightened. He says NBFCs lend for longer periods (at times more than 5 years) while the line of credit is for a shorter duration (6 months to 2 years), even though they also raise longer duration deposits, bonds and debentures. Secondly, he says, interest rates for credit have gone up impacting the viability and profitability of NBFCs.
The road ahead
The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Rules 2019 were notified on November 15, bringing non-banking financial service providers into the ambit of the insolvency and liquidation proceedings (IBC Code). This would facilitate the resolution process but that may not be enough.
Utagi says the RBI's regulations of NBFCs should be in line with the banking sector, which, he laments, is not visible yet.
Marathe says there is no short term or immediate solutions. According to him, two things need to be done: (a) NBFCs have to infuse long-term funds, including capital and (b) their asset and liability profiles have to match their respective maturity.

Decoding Bill XIV: Industrial Relations Code 2019: Balance tilts in favour of industry; makes trade unions jittery

Trade unions have raised several serious objections in the bill: from discretionary power of the executive to raising the threshold for lay-offs to making it virtually impossible to strike legally, restricting outsiders in the unorganised sector and extending fix term employment to the entire industry

twitter-logo Prasanna Mohanty        Last Updated: November 29, 2019  | 16:36 IST
Industrial Relations Code 2019: Balance tilts in favour of industry; makes trade unions jittery
Just like its previous version, this Code too has provoked widespread disapproval of all its key provisions from the trade unions with both the right and left ideological leanings and economists
The Industrial Relations Code 2019 (IR Code) is the third bill in a series of four being framed to amalgamate and rationalise more than 40 central laws governing labour affairs. It was introduced in the Lok Sabha on Thursday. Two other bills - (a) Code on Wages 2019 was introduced and passed by the Parliament in the previous session and (b) Occupational Safety, Health and Working Conditions Code 2019, which was introduced in the previous session, is now pending with a standing committee for deliberations.
The IR Code seeks to amalgamate, simplify and rationalise provisions of three central enactments relating to industrial relations -Trade Union Act of 1926, Industrial Disputes Act of 1947 and Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act of 1946.
While the Code addresses the concerns of industry and has been welcomed, it faces strong opposition from trade unions cutting across the ideological line and disapproval of economists for undermining labour rights and welfare. It is a repeat of the 2017 IR Code, which was withheld following strong protests, except for three significant departures - (a) retains threshold for prior permission for lay-offs and retrenchment at 100 workers or more by withdrawing 300 workers or more than the 2017 Code proposed while allowing it to be revised upwards with executive orders, (b) providing for "sole negotiating unions" with 75% or more presentation of workers and (c) introduction of fix-term employment.
What the 2019 Code provides:
The Statement of objects and reasons says amalgamation of the three earlier enactments mentioned earlier would "facilitate implementation and also remove the multiplicity of definitions and authorities without compromising on the basic concepts of welfare and benefits to workers".
Some of the salient features are listed below:
1.    Define "fixed-term employment" to mean engagement of a worker on the basis of a written contract for a fix period with all statutory benefits like social security, wages etc. on par with the regular employee doing similar work, thereby extending it to the entire industry (until now, it is restricted to the textile and garment sector)
2.    Define "strike" to include mass casual leave
3.    Define "worker" to include persons in supervisory capacity getting Rs 15,000 a month- up from Rs 10,000
4.    Retaining the obligation to seek prior permission for industrial establishments with 100 or more workers before lay-off, retrenchment or closure with a proviso that "appropriate government" - central and state governments - would be "empowered" to modify this threshold "by notification"
5.    Set up a re-skilling fund for training of retrenched employees to which employers would contribute 15 days of wages or such other days that may be notified by the central government
6.    Provide for "sole negotiating union" for negotiations with 75% or more representation of workers in a trade union, in absence of which a "negotiating council" would be constituted for the purpose
7.    Provide for an industrial tribunal as adjudicating body to replace court of inquiry, board of conciliation and labour courts and decide appeals against the decision of conciliating officer;
8.    Provide that reference (of disputes) by the government would not be required for Industrial Tribunal, except the National Industrial Tribunal, meaning thereby that anyone can approach Industrial Tribunal and
9.    Prohibit strikes and lockouts (a) without giving 14 days' notice and going for it "within 60 days" (b) "also during the pendency of conciliation proceedings" before a conciliation officer and continues through the proceedings in tribunal, (c) "during" the pendency of arbitration or settlement or award is in operation etc., besides providing stiff punishment for violations (fine up to Rs 10,000 and a month's imprisonment.)
Disapprobation of the Code
Just like its previous version, this Code too has provoked widespread disapproval of all its key provisions from the trade unions with both the right and left ideological leanings and economists. Here are some of the key ones.  
(i) Legal strike virtually banned, diluting rights and bargaining power of workers
CK Sajinarayanan, president of the RSS-affiliated Bharatiya Mazdoor Sangh (BMS) says he "strongly opposes" the attempt to suppress strike and dismisses it as "impractical". He says: "Such a provision was made for the public utility services earlier and did not work as most strikes happened violating it. The 14-day notice becomes meaningless, given the restrictions, and will create a fresh battleground, badly affecting industrial peace".
Tapan Sen, general secretary of the Left-leaning Centre of Indian Trade Unions (CITU) says the Code "bans strike altogether", subverting workers' rights to resort to legal strikes.
Labour economist Prof KR Shyam Sundar of XLRI's Xavier School of Management, Jamshedpur, says legal strike has been made virtually impossible because now (a) industrial disputes would come under one resolution process or the other during the timeframe fixed for strike (before a conciliation officer, tribunal or arbitration and award processes) and (b) throwing open the option of approaching the tribunal to anyone to bring it under the resolution process. He points out that redefining strike to include mass casual leave would make even coincidental leaves vulnerable to stiff penalties.
(ii) Dilution of threshold for lay-offs, retrenchment and closure
In view of persistent opposition from trade unions, the 2019 Code marks a departure from the 2017 one which had sought to increase the threshold for seeking prior permission for lay-offs, retrenchment and closure from industrial establishments with 100 workers or more to "not less than 300". The new code goes back to the older threshold (of 100 or more) but allows it to be increased through an executive order.
Sen says this is "subversion" of the process as it allows executives to change the threshold at will, rendering the entire legislative processes meaningless. Echoing similar sentiments, Sajinarayanan says this discretionary power (to central and state governments) should go. He says the BMS has been demanding to lower the threshold for long since mechanisation has enabled lesser number of workers to achieve productivity levels comparable with that of a higher number of workers in the past.
Prof Sunder explains that the discretionary provision has two serious consequences. It (a) allows differential labour structures in states and (b) more crucially, law-making is taken out of the legislature's domain to that of the executive, "which is very bad in law".
(iii) From permanent to fix term employment
Sajinarayanan says the BMS would "oppose it tooth and nail" because it enters into the domain of permanency of workers and extends the provision to the entire industry. He says it would create a new category of workers as permanent jobs would be converted to fix term jobs with social security and wages at par with the former but "no job security or permanency".
He further says: "This provision was introduced in the textile and garments industry in 2016. Three years later, this industry has gone down with units shifting to Bangladesh. It has had only a negative impact."
Prof Sundar says this change would have two consequences: (a) conversion of future permanent vacancy to fix term ones with tremendous flexibility as it is not regulated except for wages and social security and (b) job permanency would be totally diluted.
(iv) Outsiders restricted in unorganised sector-trade unions
The Code says that the unorganised sector-trade unions would need to have 50% of office bearers who are employees. This is not acceptable to trade unions. Sajinarayanan says: "From Mahatma Gandhi and Nehru onwards, many outsiders have led trade union movements and it is because of them that the trade union movement has retained its quality. We are not in favour of this."
In Sen's view this is particularly worrisome because it is meant for the unorganised sector where workers are more vulnerable to vindictive actions in the absence of outsiders' support even for demanding legitimate rights. Prof Sundar says this is "not a good labour policy as it discourages empowerment of unorganised sector workers".
(v) 75% threshold for "sole negotiating union"
This is another departure from the 2017 Code. Sajinarayanan says it is "not needed" and "not practical" because in Indian conditions no trade union can claim representation of 75% of workers or more. In India, he says, the tradition has been for all unions to join hands in negotiations.
Prof Sundar says no trade union in the world would fulfil this condition. This is self-defeating as it undermines collective bargaining and encourages a crowded negotiating council that would follow (if no union qualifies to be "sole negotiating union"). "Such a rather stiff benchmark would not help the purpose for which the law is made", he adds.
In the meanwhile, the BMS has rejected the Code completely after a prolonged deliberation in New Delhi on Friday. Sajinarayanan says the BMS is seeking withdrawal of the Code or it be sent to a Parliamentary panel for full debate before being drawn up again.

Reality Check Part V: Poor governance makes co-operative banks vulnerable to NPAs

Co-operative sector banks, particularly the urban co-operative banks (UCBs), are falling apart slowly but surely with mounting stressed assets, the full extent of which may not be known

twitter-logo Prasanna Mohanty        Last Updated: November 21, 2019  | 21:45 IST
Reality Check: Poor governance makes co-operative banks vulnerable to NPAs
Poor governance has always been a big issue with urban co-operative banks (UCBs)
The crisis of the non-performing assets (NPAs) is not restricted to the scheduled commercial banks (SCBs) alone. An equally alarming situation has emerged in the co-operative sector banks, particularly the urban co-operative banks (UCBs) like the scam-hit Punjab and Maharashtra Cooperative Bank (PMC).
The RBI Governor may have shown urgency in auctioning the assets of Housing Development & Infrastructure Ltd (HDIL) attached in the PMC case - PMC had 73% loan exposure to it by holding a meeting with the ED and Mumbai police officials last Monday (November 18), the crisis runs wider.
According to the RBI's 2018-19 annual report, 26 UCBs were put under withdrawal restrictions and 46 were found with "negative net worth" (liabilities more than assets) at the end of FY19.
Growing GNPAs in SCBs and UCBs
The RBI's latest 'Report on Trends and Progress of Banking in India 2017-18', presents a comparative graph of GNPAs in the SCBs and UCBs which shows both rising steadily in the past few years.
Stressed assets in co-operative banking sector
This report further says in FY18, the asset quality of UCBs improved, although overall profitability moderated. Among the rural co-operative segments, only the state co-operative banks (StCBs) improved their NPA ratios and profitability.
The rest three rural segments - district central co-operative banks (DCCBs), state co-operative agriculture and rural development banks (SCARDBs) and primary co-operative agriculture and rural development banks (PCARDBs) - saw "losses mounted alongside a rise in loan delinquency" in FY18.
Of the rural segments, the StCBs, DCCBs and PACs are "short-term structures" providing short-term loans, while the SCARDBs and PCARDBs are "long-term structures" providing term loans for longer periods.
The RBI database shows the GNPA ratios - GNPA to gross advances - of all these co-operative banks since FY10.
The UCBs, though constitute only 2% in number, they dominate the sector in financial powers (44% of deposits and 31% advances in FY17) as could be seen from a comparative analysis by a 2019 SBI research.
A noticeable feature in this graph is the collapse of the long-term agriculture and rural credit structures - the SCARDBs and PCARDBs - reflecting a deep crisis in the rural economy.
UCB troubles: From Harshad Mehta to Wadhawans
The problem with UCBs is not new.
Satish Marathe, director in the RBI's Central Board and a veteran of the co-operative sector, points to the Harshad Mehta-and-Hiten Dalal-led stock market scam of 1991-92 which sank the Mumbai-based Metropolitan Co-operative Bank (MCB). The MCB was liquidated in June 1992. Thereafter came the Ketan Parekh-led stock market scam of 2001 which tanked the Ahmedabad-based Madhavpura Mercantile Cooperative Bank (MMCB). After a 10-year scheme (Scheme of Reconstruction) to revive MMCB failed, the RBI liquidated it.
The PMC is the third in line which owes its trouble to Rakesh Wadhawan and his son Sarang-run HDIL which is facing the insolvency proceedings.
The following graph shows how UCBs are falling out of the map year after year since FY04 - 375 in all or at a rate of more than two every month for the past 14 years.
Diagnosis of problems with UCBs: Dual regulation
Several committees - from Satish Marathe Committee of 1991 to R Gandhi Committee of 2015 - have diagnosed the problems with the UCBs and offered solutions aplenty and yet, the PMC scam could not be prevented.
Dual regulation is considered to be one of the biggest reasons for regulatory failure.
The UCBs are governed by both state co-operative bodies and the RBI - state governments' Registrar of Co-operative Societies (RCS) regulates administrative aspects (including elections) through various state laws and the RBI the banking aspect through the Banking Regulation Act of 1949 (extended to co-operative banks in 1966). That is because the co-operative bodies have a distinct character. These are not just financial institutions but have social responsibilities and obligations too.
The RBI had pursued an active policy to promote UCBs during 1993-2004, which led to a "sharp rise" in their numbers, notwithstanding the MCB episode, but after the MMCB happened, it stopped on the track. Finding "signs of incipient financial fragilities in the sector", it went for merger/amalgamation of weak but viable UCBs and closure of unviable ones in 2005 which led to a steady fall in their numbers as the graph above shows.
RBI's plan: Conversion of UCBs to SFBs & Umbrella Organisation (UO)
An overwhelming response of banking experts to improve the functioning of UCBs has been to end dual regulations and handing over their complete control to the RBI. But this has faced resistance.
When in November 2018, the RBI issued guidelines for allowing voluntary transition of UCBs to small finance banks (SFBs), which are under complete control of the RBI, it found little traction.
Marathe says this scheme failed because the co-operative sector rejected it. He offers three reasons to explain why: (a) the co-operative sector saw no particular advantage in it (b) threat of being taken over by deep pockets when listed in stock markets and becoming corporate entities and thereby (c) losing the co-operative character (helping local people while not necessarily giving up profit-making).
The next big idea of the RBI is to establish an Umbrella Organisation (UO) for UCBs - in line with the Netherland's successful Rabobank. "Regulatory approval has been accorded to the National Federation of Urban Cooperative Banks and Credit Societies Ltd (NAFCUB) for setting up the UO as a non-deposit taking NBFC (NBFC-ND)", announced the RBI's 2018-19 annual report.
First mooted by an RBI working group (2006), UO found approval from the Malegam Committee (2011) and R Gandhi Committee (2015) with some caveats. The latter, for example, said "a prerequisite for such a successful umbrella organisation is inherently sound and well-run member institutions".
The idea of UO is, as the RBI's annual report of 2018-19 says: (a) UO would provide liquidity and capital support (UCBs can't raise capital through public issue, issue shares at premium or access to the RBI's liquidity support) (b) set up IT infrastructure and (c) offer fund management and other consultancy services and contribute to the capacity building in UCBs. That is, address the shortcomings - from fundraising to oversight.
How would it address the governance issue that the R Gandhi Committee points at remains to be seen.
Improvement in governance holds the key
Investigations into the PMC scam have shown gross financial mismanagement and a complete breakdown of internal control mechanisms. Violating banking norms, the PMC had 73% loan exposure to the HDIL, which was masked through 21,000 fictitious accounts until a whistleblower blew the cover.
But poor governance has always been a big issue with UCBs. Not just official reports, experts with decades of experience in running or monitoring UCBs assert that poor governance has to be blamed for the plight of UCBs.
Marathe says UCBs are relatively smaller financial institutions which lack professionalism, expertise and sound internal check-and-balance systems. He suggests "separation of ownership from management" as key to addressing the problem, along with capacity building to overcome knowledge and experience gaps and use of technology for better checks and balances.
S Karuppasamy, former RBI executive director handling UCB affairs, points to an RBI report which lamented lack of co-operativeness of the co-operative bodies, while highlighting governance issues.
The R Gandhi Committee of 2015 refers to this study and says: "...a study was conducted by RBI on co-operativeness of co-operative banks which found that the co-operative character of the banks is on a decline as evident from low attendance in AGMs, restrictive practices in admitting new members, low voting turnouts for elections to new managements, re-election of the same management or their family members, unanimous elections and lack of meaningful discussions in AGMs. Thus the UCBs are losing their co-operative character..."
When asked why India has failed to set up an effective mechanism to run UCBs since both the problems and solutions are well understood, Karuppasamy says the co-operative are political institutions and it needs the political will to solve their problems, which is lacking.

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