India has been struggling to put in place a uniform mechanism for safety of dams since early 1980s. The first attempt to legislate it was, however, made only in 2010, which was withdrawn for a recast when a Parliamentary panel suggested significant changes in its framework.
- Prasanna Mohanty
- New Delhi
- August 2, 2019
- UPDATED: August 2, 2019 12:07 IST
India has 5,254 large dams in operation and another 447 under construction. Then, there are thousands of other medium and small dams also, built and operated by multiple players. Their safety is of utmost importance because of the serious consequences any breach in their safety would have on human life and property.
India has been struggling to put in place a uniform mechanism for safety of dams since early 1980s. The first attempt to legislate it was, however, made only in 2010, which was withdrawn for a recast when a Parliamentary panel suggested significant changes in its framework.
The second was in 2018, the bill for the purpose of which lapsed with the dissolution of the Lok Sabha.
The Dam Safety Bill of 2019, which was introduced in the Parliament earlier in the week, is the third attempt.
What the Bill provides for
The Bill provides for a National Committee on Dam Safety (NCDS), with state representatives and specialists, for the purpose of maintaining standards of dam safety and prevention of dam failure-related disasters, evolve dam safety policies and recommend necessary regulations. Its ambit would include dams created due to land slide or glaciers outside India.
Other tasks include establishing an early warning system and explore possibilities of providing compensations through insurance coverage.
There would be a regulatory body, National Dam Safety Authority (NDSA), to implement the NCDS's policies and guidelines, resolve issues between states and others and maintain a national data base on dams.
This authority would perform the role of a State Dam Safety Organisation for a dam owned by a central public sector undertaking or extended over two or more states or where a dam in one state is owned by another state to eliminate potential causes of conflicts.
The Bill envisages State Committee on Dam Safety to ensure proper surveillance, inspection, operation and maintenance of all dams in a state for their safe functioning.
It seeks to impose an obligation on the central and state governments and other owners of dams to set up mechanisms for ensuring continued safety of dams through regular inspections, risk assessments, classify dams for vulnerability, prepare emergency action plan and disaster management, etc. There would be a State Dam Safety Authority which would submit annual reports to the Parliament and National Disaster Management Authority.
Why the Bill
The Bill says dams are critical infrastructure developed for irrigation, power generation, flood moderation and supply of water for drinking and industrial use. As such their safety has serious consequences for human life, ecology and public and private assets and a matter of great concern to the general public and becomes a national responsibility to take necessary steps to ensure it.
Starting with a Standing Committee under the chairman of the Central Water Commission in 1982, efforts were made to persuade states to legislate such a mechanism, since water is a state subject. But later, as Andhra Pradesh and West Bengal demanded a uniform central legislation the central government initiated a central legislation.
Why it makes some states and environmentalists anxious?
Several states, like Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, Kerala and Odisha, carry their past opposition to a central legislation on dam safety. Their objection is that water being a state subject, the central government is appropriating their powers over water and dam management in the guise of dam safety.
For Tamil Nadu, the cause of concern is clause 24(1) which provides for central control (through NDSA) over a dam owned by one state but located in another to prevent conflicts. Tamil Nadu claims to own, operate and maintain four dams located in Kerala - the Mullaperiyar, Parambikulam, Thunakkadavu and Peruvaripallam dams through pre-existing agreement with Kerala - and fears losing control over them.
Some of the opposition political parties have also questioned complete central government control over the top oversight and regulatory mechanism - the NDSC and NDSA. Both would be headed by serving officers of the central government, the first by the chairman of the Central Water Commission (CWC) and the latter by an officer of the additional secretary rank, thus compromising their independence.
Environmentalists have other worries. Himanshu Thakkar, coordinator for the South Asia Network on Dams, Rivers and People (SNDRP), says while there is an urgent need for such a safety mechanism, it should not be limited to structural safety of dams but extend to operational safety also as disasters happen more due to the latter.
He cites the Kerala floods of 2018 and the Uttarakhand floods of 2013 to drive his point.
In the case of Kerala, the High Court's amicus curiae Jacob P Alex had concluded that the disaster was aggravated because of operational failures of dams. His 2019 report pointed out that none of the state's 79 dams was operated or used for flood control; silts accumulated on the reservoir beds not cleared (reducing storage capacity); high storage of water at the beginning of the monsoon and sudden release of water from all dams when extreme rainfall hit on 14-16 August "resulted in worsening the floods in Kerala".
In the case of Uttarkhand, Prof Ravi Chopra of the People Science Institute, Dehradun, who headed a government-mandated investigation, said his team "came to the conclusion that existing and under-construction dams aggravated negative impacts of the flood". His report said the Tehri dam was not designed for flood control and did not have a mandated flood cushion. In several reservoirs, muck generated by dams was not cleared and when the flood came, it swamped towns and cities like Srinagar.
Thakkar's other major reservation is about the dual role of the CWC, both as policy maker and regulator - a clear conflict of interest. He says since dam safety is essentially the job of CWC, which approves designs of dams, frames policies governing them and monitors their state, it is unlikely that it would hold itself accountable if something goes wrong.
No comments:
Post a Comment