Governance Now, Nov 1-15, 2011
If he manages to transform the district administration it may pave the way for a bigger change – power to the local self-governing institutions
* The Commission noted that some Collectors were not even aware of all the laws under which they are empowered.
* In its interactions with some of the Collectors, the Commission noted that many of them were not fully aware of how many committees they are required to preside over.
These were two of the remarks of the second administrative reforms commission (ARC II), made in its 15th report on state and district administration and submitted to the union government in April 2009. The report painted a grim picture. From three primary functions during the British Raj when the post came into being – revenue collection, internal security and dispute resolution – the district collectors have come to be so overburdened that now they don’t even know what all they are supposed to do.
ARC II tried hard to list out all their responsibilities but couldn’t. It listed 15 main responsibilities – ranging from development plans of the district to welfare programmes, internal security, land and revenue administration, relief and disaster management, elections and census, local self-governing bodies and so on. It also listed 50 district-level committees that the district collectors are supposed to chair. (It took help of the district collector of Andhra Pradesh’s Anantapur in compiling the list, but added a caveat, “the Collector indicated that the names of some Committees might be missing from the list”.) Then it went on to point out other organisations like the Red Cross societies, college governing bodies, sports associations and trusts that they may need to chair.
Had the commission visited Bihar, it would have learnt that the district collectors are supposed to chair not 50 but more than 120 committees and look after more than 500 welfare programmes of the state, in addition to more than 100 centrally sponsored schemes (CSS). Besides, they have to enforce hundred of laws, they being the chief executives or administrators of the districts.
In short, it is the responsibility of the district collectors to implement and enforce all laws and welfare schemes, monitor everything else that goes on in the districts, including the local self-governance bodies like the panchayats, while not neglecting the primary responsibilities of revenue collection, internal security and judicial and magisterial functions. If they were to chair one committee meeting once a week, they will get a chance to come back to the first committee only after more than two years.
No wonder ARC II commented that such widespread functions “without well-defined roles” result in “lack of clarity” and “diffusion” of the collectors’ responsibility. It therefore recommended, among other things, that the district collectors’ role be restricted to (a) certain “core” functions – such as land and revenue administration, maintenance of law and order, disaster management, public distribution and civil supplies, excise, elections, transport, census, protocol, general administration, treasury management and (b) general coordination with various departments/agencies of the state and union government at the district.
Nitish’s moveWhen Bihar chief minister Nitish Kumar turned his focus on administrative reforms in his second innings, he decided to first reduce the burden of the district collectors and hence the circular of September 19, 2011. What he is trying to achieve is – one, to put his house in order by delegating direct responsibilities and accountabilities of the district collectors for various works to the respective district-level departments, and two, restrict the union government from burdening the district collectors with central laws and schemes.
Thus, the circular said: (a) the district collector will, as main representative of the state at the district level, provide “leadership” to the district-level departments and supervise their works but “no direct responsibility” for any departmental works be given to him/her and (b) in case the union government and any of its ministries require to pass on direct responsibilities to the district collector for any programme, they will have to seek “prior permission” of the state government.
This move has been hailed as a right step in the right direction by all, including the serving and retired bureaucrats from the state and outside. Former cabinet secretary TSR Subramanian, who along with a group of retired top bureaucrats is fighting for various administrative reform measures through their PIL in the supreme court, says the circular is a very positive step even though it merely reiterates the “traditional” role of the collector and the “prescribed” role of the functional heads of respective departments. NC Saxena, a retired bureaucrat and national advisory council (NAC) member, echoes similar sentiments.
What it means is this. The district collector’s main job has always been to provide overall leadership and coordinate with various departments to remove bottlenecks while implementation of various development and welfare works is the job of the respective district-level departments. “Why else do you need the line department hierarchy?” asks Subramanian. But as he and others point out, last 30 years have seen a plethora of general welfare programmes (through both the legislation and the schemes of the union and state governments) and since in the initial days the district-level departments, whose number has gone up gradually in the post-British era, were not capable enough the district collector came to be burdened with additional responsibilities.
It worsened over a period of time by what Subramanian terms “politicisation of administration and departmental turf-guarding which made coordination between various departments a difficult task” and Nripendra Misra, former chief of telecom regulatory authority of India (TRAI), calls an “administrative culture” that saw the chief ministers relying more on the district collectors to deliver. The CMs’ reliance eventually led to the departments putting more faith in the district collectors, rather than their own district heads.
Dual responsibility While Nitish Kumar is trying to set the internal administrative mechanism right by reducing the burden and providing sufficient space to the district collectors to lead from the front (and not get bogged down by the files and needless dabbling in everything), he realises this can’t be effective unless the union government is checked. Hence the caveat against the union government for burdening the district collectors with CSS.
There are about 150 CSS programmes at present, like MPLADS, MNREGS, NRHM, PMGSY, PDS, Indira Awas Yojna, ICDS and so on, run by various union ministries like those of rural development, health and education. In many of these cases funds are directly transferred to the district societies and require the district collectors to submit monthly and quarterly progress reports, fund utilisation certificates, physical verification of works, audit, data feeding in the MIS and so on.
Saxena, who carried out a study of the CSS, says the schemes have increased alarmingly over the past 30 years. In terms of funds, from just one-sixth of the planning commission-mandated funds for the state in the 80s to more than two-thirds now, CSS have come to demand a significant time of the district collector. In 2011-12 budget, a sum of Rs 1,88,573 crore has been set aside for CSS.
What does it mean for a state like Bihar? Vijay Prakash, principal secretary to the state’s department of planning and development, provides a broad picture. Assuming that a district collector handles about Rs 1,000 crore (the state’s plan outlay is Rs 24,000 crore and the state’s share of CSS comes to about an additional Rs 10,000 crore), 40 to 45 percent of it comprises of the CSS fund. That is the extent to which the CSS is burdening the district collector in financial terms.
The planning commission has been expressing its opposition to the CSS for a long time. Pronab Sen, advisor to the planning commission, says the plan panel considers it a “violation” of the basic federal structure of the constitution and would rather like to give the fund directly to the states and hold the states responsible for its proper utilisation. But the practice continues because various central ministries resist it, pointing out how historical evidence shows the states “delay” in fund disbursal (six months in some states) and “divert” central funds (many states used the fund to pay salary and buy furniture and vehicles). The CSS were necessitated because of the state governments’ poor record in taking care of health and education needs, social support systems etc. in the first place.
Saxena, who earlier served as secretary to the planning commission, says the solution lies in a “healthy balance” of central and state welfare measures, which means cutting down the number significantly. Currently, BK Chaturvedi, member of the planning commission, is trying to cut down the number to about one-third for the purpose of the 12th plan. That would certainly gladden the heart of Nitish Kumar and others who have had protested against CSS in the National Development Council meetings for the last 30 years. Such was the ruckus at the last NDC meeting held in October this year that the prime minister had to assure the chief ministers to “take care of” many of the CSS-related problems - which, incidentally, include inflexibility (‘one-size-fits-all’ design) and fiscal un-sustainability (inadequate financial support to the states).
Fundamental transformationWhile dealing with reforms at the state and district levels, the ARC II had pitched for another major step that both the union and state governments have completely ignored so far – devolution of power to the local self-governance bodies like the panchayats and the municipalities.
ARC II described the 73rd and 74th constitutional amendments, that paved the way for local self-governing bodies like the panchayats and municipalities, as the “most important institutional reform brought about in governance” after the reorganization of states. And then, it went on to say, “But there has been a marked reluctance on the part of most states to adequately transfer powers and functions, finances and functionaries to put local governments on the path envisaged by these constitutional amendments. As of now, most local governments are over-structured and weakly empowered. The Commission believes that India needs a fundamental transformation in governance and that empowered citizen-centric and accountable local governments are the core around which this transformation will take place.”
This is quite in keeping with former prime minister Rajiv Gandhi’s prescription for “non-responsive” district administration. (He did try to energise it by addressing the district collectors directly, but soon abandoned it because of various reasons.) Rajiv Gandhi envisioned a future when the answer could be found in the “representative” form of governance at the grassroots level – the panchayati raj institutions (PRIs). This was realised after his death (as it got enmeshed in a centre-state turf war in his lifetime). Then came the 73rd and 74th amendments, putting panchayats and municipalities on a firmer footing.
But the result has not been very encouraging. For one, the states’ reluctance to devolve adequate power has denied these bodies the opportunity to work to their true potential. Secondly, barring some exceptions, performance of the local self-governing bodies has not been too impressive for a variety of reasons. One of these is that the local bodies have become prisoners of the political parties, thereby inheriting all the ills of the governance systems of the state and national levels.
The combined effect of both is that there is little hope of the local self-governing bodies realising their potential to fundamentally alter the way we govern ourselves.
Seen from this perspective, Nitish Kumar’s reform presents a glimmer of hope. If devolving power to the line departments at the district level energises these departments, makes them more efficient, responsive and accountable, then the next logical step could be a big leap forward that ARC II hopes for – real devolution of power further down to the grassroots level to enable the citizens to make their own destiny. n
prasanna@governancenow.com
--
If he manages to transform the district administration it may pave the way for a bigger change – power to the local self-governing institutions
* The Commission noted that some Collectors were not even aware of all the laws under which they are empowered.
* In its interactions with some of the Collectors, the Commission noted that many of them were not fully aware of how many committees they are required to preside over.
These were two of the remarks of the second administrative reforms commission (ARC II), made in its 15th report on state and district administration and submitted to the union government in April 2009. The report painted a grim picture. From three primary functions during the British Raj when the post came into being – revenue collection, internal security and dispute resolution – the district collectors have come to be so overburdened that now they don’t even know what all they are supposed to do.
ARC II tried hard to list out all their responsibilities but couldn’t. It listed 15 main responsibilities – ranging from development plans of the district to welfare programmes, internal security, land and revenue administration, relief and disaster management, elections and census, local self-governing bodies and so on. It also listed 50 district-level committees that the district collectors are supposed to chair. (It took help of the district collector of Andhra Pradesh’s Anantapur in compiling the list, but added a caveat, “the Collector indicated that the names of some Committees might be missing from the list”.) Then it went on to point out other organisations like the Red Cross societies, college governing bodies, sports associations and trusts that they may need to chair.
Had the commission visited Bihar, it would have learnt that the district collectors are supposed to chair not 50 but more than 120 committees and look after more than 500 welfare programmes of the state, in addition to more than 100 centrally sponsored schemes (CSS). Besides, they have to enforce hundred of laws, they being the chief executives or administrators of the districts.
In short, it is the responsibility of the district collectors to implement and enforce all laws and welfare schemes, monitor everything else that goes on in the districts, including the local self-governance bodies like the panchayats, while not neglecting the primary responsibilities of revenue collection, internal security and judicial and magisterial functions. If they were to chair one committee meeting once a week, they will get a chance to come back to the first committee only after more than two years.
No wonder ARC II commented that such widespread functions “without well-defined roles” result in “lack of clarity” and “diffusion” of the collectors’ responsibility. It therefore recommended, among other things, that the district collectors’ role be restricted to (a) certain “core” functions – such as land and revenue administration, maintenance of law and order, disaster management, public distribution and civil supplies, excise, elections, transport, census, protocol, general administration, treasury management and (b) general coordination with various departments/agencies of the state and union government at the district.
Nitish’s moveWhen Bihar chief minister Nitish Kumar turned his focus on administrative reforms in his second innings, he decided to first reduce the burden of the district collectors and hence the circular of September 19, 2011. What he is trying to achieve is – one, to put his house in order by delegating direct responsibilities and accountabilities of the district collectors for various works to the respective district-level departments, and two, restrict the union government from burdening the district collectors with central laws and schemes.
Thus, the circular said: (a) the district collector will, as main representative of the state at the district level, provide “leadership” to the district-level departments and supervise their works but “no direct responsibility” for any departmental works be given to him/her and (b) in case the union government and any of its ministries require to pass on direct responsibilities to the district collector for any programme, they will have to seek “prior permission” of the state government.
This move has been hailed as a right step in the right direction by all, including the serving and retired bureaucrats from the state and outside. Former cabinet secretary TSR Subramanian, who along with a group of retired top bureaucrats is fighting for various administrative reform measures through their PIL in the supreme court, says the circular is a very positive step even though it merely reiterates the “traditional” role of the collector and the “prescribed” role of the functional heads of respective departments. NC Saxena, a retired bureaucrat and national advisory council (NAC) member, echoes similar sentiments.
What it means is this. The district collector’s main job has always been to provide overall leadership and coordinate with various departments to remove bottlenecks while implementation of various development and welfare works is the job of the respective district-level departments. “Why else do you need the line department hierarchy?” asks Subramanian. But as he and others point out, last 30 years have seen a plethora of general welfare programmes (through both the legislation and the schemes of the union and state governments) and since in the initial days the district-level departments, whose number has gone up gradually in the post-British era, were not capable enough the district collector came to be burdened with additional responsibilities.
It worsened over a period of time by what Subramanian terms “politicisation of administration and departmental turf-guarding which made coordination between various departments a difficult task” and Nripendra Misra, former chief of telecom regulatory authority of India (TRAI), calls an “administrative culture” that saw the chief ministers relying more on the district collectors to deliver. The CMs’ reliance eventually led to the departments putting more faith in the district collectors, rather than their own district heads.
Dual responsibility While Nitish Kumar is trying to set the internal administrative mechanism right by reducing the burden and providing sufficient space to the district collectors to lead from the front (and not get bogged down by the files and needless dabbling in everything), he realises this can’t be effective unless the union government is checked. Hence the caveat against the union government for burdening the district collectors with CSS.
There are about 150 CSS programmes at present, like MPLADS, MNREGS, NRHM, PMGSY, PDS, Indira Awas Yojna, ICDS and so on, run by various union ministries like those of rural development, health and education. In many of these cases funds are directly transferred to the district societies and require the district collectors to submit monthly and quarterly progress reports, fund utilisation certificates, physical verification of works, audit, data feeding in the MIS and so on.
Saxena, who carried out a study of the CSS, says the schemes have increased alarmingly over the past 30 years. In terms of funds, from just one-sixth of the planning commission-mandated funds for the state in the 80s to more than two-thirds now, CSS have come to demand a significant time of the district collector. In 2011-12 budget, a sum of Rs 1,88,573 crore has been set aside for CSS.
What does it mean for a state like Bihar? Vijay Prakash, principal secretary to the state’s department of planning and development, provides a broad picture. Assuming that a district collector handles about Rs 1,000 crore (the state’s plan outlay is Rs 24,000 crore and the state’s share of CSS comes to about an additional Rs 10,000 crore), 40 to 45 percent of it comprises of the CSS fund. That is the extent to which the CSS is burdening the district collector in financial terms.
The planning commission has been expressing its opposition to the CSS for a long time. Pronab Sen, advisor to the planning commission, says the plan panel considers it a “violation” of the basic federal structure of the constitution and would rather like to give the fund directly to the states and hold the states responsible for its proper utilisation. But the practice continues because various central ministries resist it, pointing out how historical evidence shows the states “delay” in fund disbursal (six months in some states) and “divert” central funds (many states used the fund to pay salary and buy furniture and vehicles). The CSS were necessitated because of the state governments’ poor record in taking care of health and education needs, social support systems etc. in the first place.
Saxena, who earlier served as secretary to the planning commission, says the solution lies in a “healthy balance” of central and state welfare measures, which means cutting down the number significantly. Currently, BK Chaturvedi, member of the planning commission, is trying to cut down the number to about one-third for the purpose of the 12th plan. That would certainly gladden the heart of Nitish Kumar and others who have had protested against CSS in the National Development Council meetings for the last 30 years. Such was the ruckus at the last NDC meeting held in October this year that the prime minister had to assure the chief ministers to “take care of” many of the CSS-related problems - which, incidentally, include inflexibility (‘one-size-fits-all’ design) and fiscal un-sustainability (inadequate financial support to the states).
Fundamental transformationWhile dealing with reforms at the state and district levels, the ARC II had pitched for another major step that both the union and state governments have completely ignored so far – devolution of power to the local self-governance bodies like the panchayats and the municipalities.
ARC II described the 73rd and 74th constitutional amendments, that paved the way for local self-governing bodies like the panchayats and municipalities, as the “most important institutional reform brought about in governance” after the reorganization of states. And then, it went on to say, “But there has been a marked reluctance on the part of most states to adequately transfer powers and functions, finances and functionaries to put local governments on the path envisaged by these constitutional amendments. As of now, most local governments are over-structured and weakly empowered. The Commission believes that India needs a fundamental transformation in governance and that empowered citizen-centric and accountable local governments are the core around which this transformation will take place.”
This is quite in keeping with former prime minister Rajiv Gandhi’s prescription for “non-responsive” district administration. (He did try to energise it by addressing the district collectors directly, but soon abandoned it because of various reasons.) Rajiv Gandhi envisioned a future when the answer could be found in the “representative” form of governance at the grassroots level – the panchayati raj institutions (PRIs). This was realised after his death (as it got enmeshed in a centre-state turf war in his lifetime). Then came the 73rd and 74th amendments, putting panchayats and municipalities on a firmer footing.
But the result has not been very encouraging. For one, the states’ reluctance to devolve adequate power has denied these bodies the opportunity to work to their true potential. Secondly, barring some exceptions, performance of the local self-governing bodies has not been too impressive for a variety of reasons. One of these is that the local bodies have become prisoners of the political parties, thereby inheriting all the ills of the governance systems of the state and national levels.
The combined effect of both is that there is little hope of the local self-governing bodies realising their potential to fundamentally alter the way we govern ourselves.
Seen from this perspective, Nitish Kumar’s reform presents a glimmer of hope. If devolving power to the line departments at the district level energises these departments, makes them more efficient, responsive and accountable, then the next logical step could be a big leap forward that ARC II hopes for – real devolution of power further down to the grassroots level to enable the citizens to make their own destiny. n
prasanna@governancenow.com
--
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