Talk by all means but don’t lower the guard and allow the rebels to
regroup, re-arm and emerge stronger, as happened during the failed
talks of 2004
By the time you read this the government would probably have taken a
decision to hold peace talks with the leftwing extremists and worked
out broad parameters within which to carry the process forward. There
are good reasons to hold talks and stop the bloodbath witnessed in the
past few weeks, even if sincerity of the rebels is doubtful. Union
Home Minister P Chidambaram, who is rightly, and for the first time
since the problem erupted, confronting it as a big threat to the
national security, has been at pains to explain that it isn’t a war
“because we don’t wage war against our own people”. Seen from that
perspective, peace talk is a logical step to take. But there are a few
lessons from the past that should not be ignored.
The first lesson from the last failed attempt in 2004--when Andhra’s
Rajasekhara Reddy government invited rebels--is that the rebels used
the opportunity to rest, re-group, re-arm and emerge a far more deadly
force than ever before. In the present instance, the rebels have asked
the centre to stop its offensive for 72 days as against Chidambaram’s
offer to stop violence for 72 hours. That should raise eyebrows but
more than that it is the timing of the peace offer which raises
serious doubts. Remember, it came days after rebels killed 24 Eastern
Frontier Rifles jawans in West Bengal, when a counter offensive could
have been expected. It was also the time when Chidambaram was planning
a second round of talks with chief ministers of West Bengal, Bihar and
Jharkhand within days of the first one in Kolkata (which Bihar and
Jharkhand CMs had skipped). That wouldn’t have escaped rebel’s
notice. It would, therefore, be reasonable to suspect that the rebels’
offer could be a ploy to buy time, rework their strategy and possibly
relocate the militia away from the borders of Bihar-Jharkhand-West
Bengal.
In 2004, the ceasefire was used by the rebels to hold public meetings
throughout the state and mobilize over-ground support. Rebel leader
Ramakrishna and his comrades flaunted their weapons publicly and gave
an impression that they were about to take over the state power. Local
political leaders were pressurized to mobilize crowd for their rallies
and funds were collected openly. A senior officer of Andhra Pradesh
recalls how many traders migrated to bigger cities out of fear. He
also recalls how it sent a wrong signal to the security force and
demoralized them. None of these should be allowed to happen again.
While the 2004 talks were in progress, the rebels made it clear they
would not lay down arms even if the talks succeeded. When it failed,
Ramakrishna said: “The talks are not about the armed struggle but are
about efforts to solve some immediate socio-economic problems of the
people”. During the peace talks he and his men had asked YSR to
produce proof to establish that he had actually distributed land free
to the landless, which was one of the agreements to carry the process
forward. Read Maoist leader Kishenji’s statement (carried by PTI)
offering peace talks carefully: “State governments and the centre
should not indulge in violence between February 25 and May 7 and
concentrate on development of tribal areas which will be reciprocated
by Maoists” (emphasis ours). Can you see similarity?
The government must talk but on no account the guard be lowered or the
forces deployed in rebel-hit areas be withdrawn. The training for
security forces, most of which is completely incapable of handling the
guerilla warfare techniques used by the rebels, must continue. So
should the effort to take Bihar and Jharkhand on board in the fight
against the menace. It should never be forgotten that one of the
first lessons taught to these rebels is Mao’s famous statement: “Every
communist must grasp the truth; political power grows out of the
barrel of a gun.” Only when the rebels realize that the government has
a more powerful gun which it intends to use decisively, peace will
break out.
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