Governance Now, Oct 1-15, 2011
The most 
exasperating aspect of terror strikes in our country is the 
perpetrators’ supreme confidence. They had, in a way, issued a warning 
on May 13 by putting a bomb at the Delhi high court’s parking lot. It 
didn’t kill anyone and the matter was casually dismissed by our security
 and intelligence agencies as a ‘minor’ incident. And then they 
revisited the spot on September 7, killing 15 and injuring more than 50,
 and sent not one but four separate emails to claim responsibility. One 
of these mails even warned of an impending strike at a shopping mall. Is 
the office of the National Investigation Agency (NIA), probing both the 
incidents from a rented office in the Supreme Forum mall of Jasola in 
southeast Delhi, their next target? It could well be so.  
You want to know the secret of their confidence? Read on.
Politicisation of Terror
Barely
 three weeks after the ghastly 26/11 terror strike that killed 260 
people, the government enacted the National Investigation Agency (NIA) 
Act 2008 to set up NIA as a tool to fight terror. Its mandate was “to 
investigate and prosecute offences affecting the sovereignty, security 
and integrity of India, security of State, friendly relations with 
foreign States and offences under Acts enacted to implement 
international treaties, agreements, conventions and resolutions of the 
United Nations, its agencies and other international organisations and 
for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto” as home minister P
 Chidambaram himself outlined it at the end of the bill.
There
 have been several terror strikes since then – at German Bakery of Pune 
in February 2010, at Chinnaswamy stadium of Bangalore in April 2010, 
firing on foreigners outside Delhi’s Jama Masjid in September 2010, at 
Dashashwamedh Ghat of Varanasi in December 2010, at Zaveri Bazaar and 
elsewhere in Mumbai in July 2011 and two blasts outside the Delhi high 
court in May and September 2011. These strikes are believed to be the 
handiwork of the usual suspects – HuJI, SIMI, IM and so on.
NIA
 is the obvious choice to take up these cases, you would think. But 
wait. Except for the Delhi high court blasts, these terror attacks are 
not probed by it.
You would wonder what NIA is doing 
then, apart from probing the Delhi high court blasts. Well, it is 
probing the terror cases that happened before it came into existence: 
the Malegaon blast of September 2006, Samjhauta Express blasts of 
February 2007, Ajmer Sharif blasts of October 2007, Modasa blast of 
September 2008 and the Sunil Joshi murder case of December 2007.
Why so? Look closely for answer. All these latter cases are suspected to be the handiwork of the ‘saffron’ terrorists.
There you are. NIA is, primarily, tasked to probe the ‘saffron’ terror. 
No,
 you are not wrong to assume that NIA has been turned into a political 
tool already, something that has happened with all our police and 
intelligence agencies too. So, what would you expect when the BJP or 
BJP-led coalition comes to power? Turn NIA on its head. Won’t it?
Just see how electoral (or vote bank) politics determines even our fight against terror.
The
 Jammu and Kashmir assembly (whose new session begins from September 26)
 has admitted a resolution seeking “amnesty” for Afzal Guru, who was 
awarded death sentence in 2004 for his involvement in the 2001 attack on
 our parliament. Recently, the home ministry asked the president to 
reject his mercy petition pending since 2006. The HuJI, in its mail, 
said the attack on Delhi high court was in retaliation to this.
In
 August, the Tamil Nadu assembly passed a “unanimous resolution” 
appealing the president to “reconsider” the mercy petition of the Rajiv 
Gandhi killers – Murugan, Santhan and Perarivalan. Around the same time,
 the Madras high court stayed their execution. Ram Jethmalani, the BJP 
MP who pleaded their case, was quoted as saying afterwards: “The high 
court is doing justice. Be sure.”
This followed yet 
another similar episode. In May this year, the president rejected mercy 
petition of Devender Pal Singh Bhullar of Khalistan Liberation Force – 
sentenced to death for the 1993 Delhi blast that was targeted at Youth 
Congress leader Manjit Singh Bitta – hours after the supreme court 
issued notices on a writ petition questioning a long delay in his 
execution. Various Sikh bodies now want the Punjab assembly to request 
the “commuting” of his death sentence. Politicians cutting across party 
lines have joined the chorus. 
Recall how, when 
Digvijaya Singh, twice chief minister of Madhya Pradesh and Congress 
general secretary, had to criticise Pakistan for harbouring Osama bin 
Laden after the Abbottabad operation in May this year, he had to add an 
honorific ‘ji’ while referring to the dreaded terrorist (“Osamaji”).
More
 recently, a day after the September 7 blast, former defence minister 
who was chief minister of UP several times, Mulayam Singh Yadav declared
 in Delhi without any apparent provocation: “Whenever there is a terror 
act, a particular community is looked at with suspicion. This is not 
good. It should stop. It is dangerous.”
Also recall how
 the BJP-run state governments dragged their feet when it emerged that 
the ‘saffron’ terror was behind some of the terror incidents like the 
Malegaon and Samjhauta Express blasts. This was one of the reasons why 
NIA was given the job to “reinvestigate” those cases. (And that is also 
why the BJP-ruled states are not cooperating with NIA in 
investigations.)
With so much politics at play and so 
many politicians and political parties willing to defend even the 
confirmed and convicted terrorists, any wonder the terrorists are having
 a free run in this country? 
9/11 and 26/11
What
 did the US do after 9/11? They appointed a National Commission on 
Terrorist Attacks upon the US and took a comprehensive look at the 
failures, institutional and otherwise. The report ripped apart the 
security and intelligence mechanisms of the US, described the 
Congressional oversight mechanism as “dysfunctional” and suggested 
radical changes. The changes were brought in –a new Department of 
Homeland Security with overarching and wide range of powers, a tough 
Patriot Act, more teeth to the FBI and so on. This highly critical and 
unsparing report was made public and is available in bookshops across 
the world. 
Compare this to our 26/11. It was the state
 government which appointed the Pradhan committee to go into it, but 
with a limited mandate – “lapses to act on intelligence inputs”, “lapses
 to promptly act or react” by the Mumbai police and “to make appropriate
 recommendations”.  It was assumed from the very beginning that 26/11 
was the failure of the state police alone. There was no need to probe 
into the role of any other agency or agencies – state intelligence unit,
 central intelligence agencies like Intelligence Bureau (IB), Research 
and Analysis Wing (RAW), Joint Investigation Committee (JIC) or 
enforcement agencies like Coast Guard, National Security Guard (NSG) and
 the naval commandos (involved in fighting the terrorists before NSG 
stepped in) etc.
And the results of even this limited 
exercise of the Pradhan committee were not made public. After the report
 was leaked to the media, a Marathi version of it was tabled in the 
assembly. As for acting on its recommendations, no change has been 
noticed on the ground. 
We simply don’t have a culture 
of introspection, accountability or taking the responsibility for such 
gross failures that the US agencies did and hence, are better placed to 
add teeth to their counter-terror activities.
Chidambaram, who 
replaced Shivraj Patil as home minister after 26/11, did initiate some 
measures at the centre. Here is a low down on these measures:
*
 The Multi-agency Centre (MAC) was set up under the IB’s supervision. 
Its mandate is to “pull” more information and intelligence from state 
capitals and “push” more information and intelligence into the security 
system. 
This is a duplication of what the JIC, 
functioning under the National Security Advisor (NSA) in the PMO, is 
supposed to do. Those in the know say MAC meets every day and is “slowly
 taking shape”. But it has made no visible or discernible difference yet
 to the fight against terror. More on this later.
* NIA
 was set up. As noted above, it has been turned into a political tool. 
Moreover, instead of creating a new infrastructure of its own, the 
agency has borrowed manpower from various state police, central 
intelligence agencies and paramilitary forces. Close to half of its 
investigators are from the central paramilitary forces with no 
experience and training in investigation.
* A “security
 meeting” was started on a daily basis. The NSA, home secretary, RAW 
secretary, IB director, JIC chairman and special secretary (internal 
security) of MHA attend this meeting. 
* NATGRID is 
being set up to provide “quick, seamless and secure access” to 21 sets 
of database available with government departments. The cabinet gave its 
clearance only in June this year and it is expected to be operational 
next year. 
Former home secretary G K Pillai, who 
played a significant role in developing the new security architecture, 
says it should have come up a year ago but didn’t, because “no one is 
willing to part with information. They (concerned departments and 
agencies) are used to a culture of telling only when asked, not 
otherwise”.
* A National Counter Terrorism Centre 
(NCTC) is proposed to be set up. This would be a body under the MHA and 
perform “functions relating to intelligence, investigation and 
operations”. All intelligence agencies would be represented in NCTC. In 
fact, it will have NIA, NTRO (National Technical Research Organisation),
 JIC, NCRB (National Crime Records Bureau), NSG, NATGRID and CCTNS 
(Crime and Criminal Tracking Network & Systems) within its fold.
RAW,
 ARC (Aviation Research Centre) and CBI (Central Bureau of 
Investigation) will function under its “oversight” and representatives 
of intelligence agencies of the armed forces will be its members.
The
 whole concept, and even the very title of NCTC, is a direct lift from 
the 9/11 Commission report. Chidambaram banks a lot on this to achieve 
his goal – “to disrupt, dismantle and eventually defeat the terrorist 
groups”. Close to three years since 26/11, NCTC is still at the drafting
 stage. 
Reason? Pillai says: “There are issues of territory, turf and ego between departments.” This is self-explanatory.
*
 A Central Foreigners’ Bureau (CFB) has been proposed to keep a tab on 
undesirable foreign elements. This is a long term project – four to five
 years – for which more than Rs 1,000 crore is needed. There is little 
information about its progress.
* A separate department
 or ministry for “internal security” has been proposed. Chidambaram 
wanted to recreate the US Department of Homeland Security. Nothing has 
been heard on it since he last spoke about it in December 2009.
Ajai
 Sahni, a counter-terrorism expert and executive director of the New 
Delhi-based think tank Centre for Conflict Management, has this to say 
on Chidambaram’s biggest anti-terror tool, NCTC: “We don’t need super 
bureaucrats discussing (security issues) in New Delhi. We need 
operational intelligence and coordination. NCTC will be as useless as 
JIC. We need NCTC when there is (adequate) flow of intelligence from the
 ground.”
His prescription: “Our basic need is to create intelligence and operational capabilities at the grassroots level.”  
Pillai
 provides some startling facts and figures. He says, our police forces 
need 18,00,000 more personnel to reach the target of 230 policemen for 
every 1,00,000 population. Our national average at present is a pathetic
 130/1,00,000. 
IB needs 4,500 personnel. The 
government recruited 800 personnel in 2009 (that is the number we can 
handle at a time for the purpose of their 18-month training). These 800 
personnel will go to the field, after completing their training, this 
year and it will take three to five years for them to develop sources.
His conclusion? “Our intelligence level is still the same as that existed in 2008 (before 26/11).”
Terror
 strikes in the UK and US prompted their intelligence agencies to focus 
their attention on suspicious segments of society, carry out extensive 
community contact programmes that continue till date, carry out 
extensive surveillance, identify and isolate suspicious elements and 
develop quick response teams. These steps paid rich dividends. We 
haven’t attempted any of these.
A former joint director
 of IB, M K Dhar, says the problem with our intelligence agencies is 
that they have very little assets in susceptible communities where 
homegrown terror modules live and thrive.
To make 
matters worse, he says, the moment a raid happens or an ‘encounter’ 
takes place in a Muslim-dominated area, various human-right groups, NGOs
 and political parties jump in and make life miserable for our security 
forces. 
There are other systemic issues too – lack of 
transparent and merit-based recruitment and arbitrary posting and 
transfer of police personnel. 
It is too well known 
that no government recruitment takes place without paying money anywhere
 in the country. (“Corruption starts with the very appointment of the 
policeman”, says Pillai.) The National Police Mission Division (NPMD) of
 the Bureau of Police Research and Development (BPRD) devised a 
transparent recruitment policy, which cuts out “discretionary powers” of
 the politicians, and the home ministry circulated it to all state 
governments. Only UP followed it and recruited 19,000 personnel last 
year. UP has also set up a Civil Service Board, supposedly independent 
of the political masters, to regulate posting and transfer of police 
officers in the state. But the average tenure of an SP in the state is 
four months. 
That is so, because orders come to the board directly from the chief minister’s office and it complies.
Having
 paid money for the job and living at the mercy of politicians day in 
and day out, cops can hardly be expected to do justice to their job. 
Moreover, their primary job is to maintain law and order and VIP 
security. Intelligence comes third in the list of priorities for which 
little time or resources are available.
“Why is the 
law and order situation bad in the country?” asks Pillai, before 
answering it himself: “Because no officer can be held responsible or 
accountable if he is not in control of his force.” He adds that 
accountability exists and works in our armed forces because the officers
 themselves decide these matters.
Dark World of Intelligence
Our
 intelligence and security agencies live and work in complete secrecy. 
They don’t exist or work outside some inaccessible files. Every possible
 thing that one probably needs to know about the US Department of 
Homeland Security or FBI – mandate, mission, budgets, ways and means to 
interact and inform or know about terror threats and terrorists – is 
available on their websites. Ours simply don’t exist.
The
 US Congress has an oversight committee to review, monitor and supervise
 functioning of their intelligence and security agencies. The 9/11 
Commission report said this about its functioning: “Congressional 
oversight for intelligence – and counterterrorism – is now 
dysfunctional. Congress should address the problem. We have considered 
various alternatives….” (Congress is to the US what parliament is for 
us).
Can you think of a similar mechanism or report in 
India? Sahni says that to expect accountability in intelligence agencies
 when there is “not even a rudimentary accountability” in any government
 department is foolish. He draws attention to how even a constitutional 
body like the Comptroller and Auditor General of India (CAG) came under 
fire from the government, no less than the PM himself, for exposing 2G, 
CWG and ISRO Spectrum scams. Our intelligence and other security 
agencies are reporting to the very same politicians. 
Here
 is a secret revealed. CAG submitted a special audit report exposing 
massive corruption in NTRO and actions of its officials leading to 
compromise with national security to the PMO in February this year. This
 happened because of a whistleblower, V K Mittal, and a daring CAG, 
Vinod Rai. The PMO, instead of acting on it, constituted another probe 
and entrusted the task to RAW chief Sanjeev Tripathi. Tripathi recently 
returned the brief, expressing his inability to probe the matter. All 
that the PMO officials now say is that it is an “unfortunate 
development”.
Dhar says he and other like-minded people
 have been demanding parliamentary oversight over our intelligence and 
security agencies, just as it exists in the US. Vice president Hamid 
Ansari made an impassioned plea for setting up a parliamentary standing 
committee to make intelligence agencies accountable to the legislature 
while addressing the R N Kao Memorial Lecture in January 2010. Manish 
Tewari of the Congress has moved a private member’s bill in this regard 
too, but there is little political will to make it happen.
Now
 you know the secret of terrorists’ supreme confidence: An overdose of 
politics even when it involves confirmed and convicted terrorists and 
complete absence of accountability and transparency in our governance 
system.
Box 1 
Chidambaram’s new architecture
Multi-agency Centre (MAC):
 Part of IB and meets every day. Its job is to “pull” more information 
and intelligence from state capitals and “push” more information and 
intelligence into the security system.
Daily security 
meeting: Home minister takes this meeting every day, around noon, which 
is attended by NSA, home secretary, secretary (RAW), DIB, chairman of 
JIC and special secretary (internal security) of MHA.
NCTC:
 The proposed body to take NIA, NTRO, JIC, NCRB, NATGRID, CCTNS and NSG 
under its wings. RAW, ARC and CBI to be under its oversight. 
Intelligence units of the armed forces will have its representation too.
 It will be part of the MHA.
NATGRID: to provide “quick, seamless and secure access” to 21 sets of data base available with government departments.
NIA: Established in December 2008 to investigate terror cases.
Central Foreigners’ Bureau: To monitor foreign nationals
Old and existing architecture
Intelligence elements: IB
 (reports to HM), RAW (reports to PM), JIC, NTRO, ARC (report to NSA), 
National Security Council Secretariat (reports to NSA). 
Armed forces have their own intelligence agencies and an umbrella body, DIA. 
Agencies specialising in finanacial intelligence – directorates in Income Tax, Customs and Central Excise, Financial Intelligence Unit, Enforcement Directorate.
Enforcement elements: CRPF, BSF, CISF, ITBP, Assam Rifles, SSB, NSG.
Administrative elements: MHA, PMO and cabinet secretariat
Toothless Tiger
Terror cases with NIA
1. Delhi high court blasts, May and Sept 2011
2.    Malegaon blast, Sept 2006
3.    Samjhauta Express blasts, February 2007
4.    Ajmer Sharif blasts, October 2007
5.    Modasa (Gujarat) blast, September 2008
6.    Sunil Joshi murder case, December 2007
All
 except the first happened before NIA came into existence and which are 
suspected to be the handiwork of ‘saffron’ terror groups. And in none of
 these cases the state governments are cooperating with NIA.
Terror cases not with NIA1.    German bakery blast of Feb 2010
2.    Blasts at Chinnaswamy stadium, Bangalore, April 2010
3.    Firing at foreigners outside Jama Masjid, Sept 2010
4.    Blasts at Dashashwamedha Ghat, Varanasi, Dec 2010
5.    Mumbai blasts of July 2011
In none of these saffron terror groups are suspected to be involved but happened after NIA came into being.