Governance Now, March 1-15, 2011, edit
Three states have fallen prey to the Maoists’ designs. We can’t afford your aloofness any more
Around this time last year, union home minister P Chidambaram was leading the charge against the dreaded Maoists, described as the “biggest threat” to the internal security of the country by no less than the prime minister himself on more than one occasion. After years of pussy-footing, the state, finally, seemed determined to stand up to the challenge and when Chidambaram talked about the possibility of eliminating the menace in a couple of years’ time, he was cheered on by a large section of the people who felt reassured at his commitment and drive. Then the inevitable happened. In April, 76 CRPF jawans were massacred by the Maoists in the Dantewada jungles of Chhattisgarh. Three months later, another group of 26 CRPF jawans was butchered in a similar fashion in the Narayanpur jungles. This was inevitable because these CRPF contingents were untrained and unfamiliar with the territory, and yet careless enough to ignore the basics of the standard operating procedures (SOP). Chidambaram was very much in charge after the first incident. He rushed to Dantewada to honour the dead soldiers and revive the morale of those still fighting. But he was found missing from the battlefield after the Narayanpur massacre and continues to be so. Did you hear him speak or rush to Orissa when the Malkangiri collector was abducted by the Maoists and the state completely capitulated to secure his release?
Something had snapped after the Dantewada massacre. Chidambaram was abused and given public lessons on the “root cause” of the Maoist menace and the “right way” to fight it by his party men, who were ably led by a couch potato, Digvijay Singh. Why was he attracting the blame to himself and his party-led central government for something that was essentially the state’s problem? That was the “political” message from such worthies as Digvijay Singh to Chidambaram. Unfortunately, Chidambaram balked. Chhattisgarh virtually abandoned its fight against the ultras after the two massacres. No major offensive has been launched in the state thereafter. Now, the Orissa government has publicly declared that “there will be no coercive action by the security forces as long as the Maoists do not indulge in unlawful activities”. One of the key demands of the Maoists, for releasing the collector, was to “stop Operation Greenhunt” in the state altogether. The state has obliged. It has also freed some top-notch Maoist leaders, including their central committee members, and has agreed to free nearly 700 of the cadre. What this mean is that two frontline states have laid down their arms in the fight against the “biggest threat” to the internal security of the country.
Add West Bengal, another frontline state, to the list. With the help of Chidambaram, the state managed to regain Lalgarh and the surrounding Junglemahal last year. The Maoists have been pushed back, but not eliminated. If it was his party men who stopped Chidambaram in his track in Chhattisgarh, it is his ally Mamata Banerjee of the Trinamool Congress who hounded him out of West Bengal because she wants to win the next assembly election with their help.
Digvijay Singh, Mamata Banerjee and Naveen Patnaik may say or do what they will, but you were right, Mr Chidambaram, in taking on the Maoists directly. You correctly understood the import of the prime minister’s words and provided the right impetus to the drive against the menace. The Maoists remain the biggest challenge to internal security and having spread their tentacles close to a dozen states, federal intervention is indeed called for. It is beyond petty politics, internal squabbles or short-term electoral gains. The job at hands calls for a clear understanding of the motive and the goal of the ultras, which is to overthrow the state through an “armed struggle”, and a clear-headed strategy to counter it. Evidently, this is not the case with many of the state governments.
Today two states have capitulated and another has been neutralised. It would be no surprise if other states too fall prey to the similar designs of the Maoists. And when that happens, the battle will truly be lost. We will be back to square one. It is time for you, Mr Chidambaram, therefore, to take charge of the situation now.
Tuesday, March 1, 2011
Friday, February 18, 2011
Go green to avoid food crisis
Governance Now, edit, Feb 15-18, 2011
Greenpeace India warns government against continued promotion of, and reliance on, chemical fertilizers
The remarkable success story of the “green revolution”, which turned a starving nation into a food sufficient one in a matter of years, can’t be overstated. Ironically, however, one of the key elements of that revolution – extensive use of chemical fertilizer which was subsidised by the government - now threatens to turn that very revolution on its head. In a report that should serve as the wake up call, Greenpeace India, an international environmental group, has issued a grim warning of what awaits us. It says, after studying the impact of government policies on soil health across five states that “indiscriminate chemical fertilizer usage, catalysed by a lenient subsidy policy and neglect of ecological fertilisation is posing a threat to soil health and future food security of the country”. This is an outcome of a study of the situation in five states - Assam, Orissa, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh and Punjab.
Not that the policy makers are unaware of the situation. In fact, acknowledgement of this problem led to the nutrient-based subsidy (NBS) regime, which was introduced last year. NBS is a nutrient-centric subsidy model applicable only to three macro nutrients – nitrogen (N), phosphorous (P) and potassium (P). The Greenpeace report argues, and rightly so, that the NBS regime supports the same old chemical fertilizers, instead of addressing the issue. The answer, clearly, lies in substituting chemical fertilizers with the organic ones about which an overwhelming number of farmers are aware, the study quotes its survey in those states to assert. But the government, though claims to be promoting green manure, is actually doing precious little. The study analyses five major government schemes to show that of Rs 49,980 crore spent on promoting chemical fertilizers in 2009-10, only one-tenth, that is Rs 5,375 crore, was spent on four of the schemes that promoted organic fertilizers. Further analysis of money spent on one such scheme, Rashtriya Krishi Vikas Yojana (RKVY), shows the amount earmarked for organic farming/biofertilizer component was in the range of 2.01-2.64 percent between 2007 and 2010. “States like Punjab, which is suffering from indiscriminate chemical fertilizer usage, have not even spent a single rupee on this component (of RKVY)”, the report says, adding that “thus, we can conclude that there is hardly any support for ecological/organic fertilization”.
Fortunately, it is not too late. “The soil is in very poor health but we have not yet reached the stage where we have lost it completely. Even now farmers can reclaim their soil by shifting away from chemical fertilizers to ecological fertilisation, which will not only fix the problems in their soil but also provide sustained production”, co-author of the report Gopikrishna S R said while releasing the report. His survey shows 96 percent of farmers know that chemical fertilization leads to soil degradation and 98 percent showed willingness to switch to organic fertilizers “if these are subsidised and made easily available”. The report points out how chemical fertilizers cause depletion of water resources, salinity, hard pan formation, increased reliance on inorganic fertilizers, higher cost of cultivation, late showing of rabi crop and degradation of eco-system.
Needless to say, the course correction would require a shift in focus and the Greenpeace suggests several measures the essence of which is to generate and add large quantities of biomas in soil. These suggestions include various initiatives to promote in-situ (on farm) and ex-situ (outside farm) methods of biomas generation, supporting composting techniques, crop rotation or inter-cropping involving legumes, providing bio-fertilizers and farm-made manures and incentives to farmers to maintain proper soil health. The farmers are willing. All that is needed is institutional support, which is not such a tall order really.
Greenpeace India warns government against continued promotion of, and reliance on, chemical fertilizers
The remarkable success story of the “green revolution”, which turned a starving nation into a food sufficient one in a matter of years, can’t be overstated. Ironically, however, one of the key elements of that revolution – extensive use of chemical fertilizer which was subsidised by the government - now threatens to turn that very revolution on its head. In a report that should serve as the wake up call, Greenpeace India, an international environmental group, has issued a grim warning of what awaits us. It says, after studying the impact of government policies on soil health across five states that “indiscriminate chemical fertilizer usage, catalysed by a lenient subsidy policy and neglect of ecological fertilisation is posing a threat to soil health and future food security of the country”. This is an outcome of a study of the situation in five states - Assam, Orissa, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh and Punjab.
Not that the policy makers are unaware of the situation. In fact, acknowledgement of this problem led to the nutrient-based subsidy (NBS) regime, which was introduced last year. NBS is a nutrient-centric subsidy model applicable only to three macro nutrients – nitrogen (N), phosphorous (P) and potassium (P). The Greenpeace report argues, and rightly so, that the NBS regime supports the same old chemical fertilizers, instead of addressing the issue. The answer, clearly, lies in substituting chemical fertilizers with the organic ones about which an overwhelming number of farmers are aware, the study quotes its survey in those states to assert. But the government, though claims to be promoting green manure, is actually doing precious little. The study analyses five major government schemes to show that of Rs 49,980 crore spent on promoting chemical fertilizers in 2009-10, only one-tenth, that is Rs 5,375 crore, was spent on four of the schemes that promoted organic fertilizers. Further analysis of money spent on one such scheme, Rashtriya Krishi Vikas Yojana (RKVY), shows the amount earmarked for organic farming/biofertilizer component was in the range of 2.01-2.64 percent between 2007 and 2010. “States like Punjab, which is suffering from indiscriminate chemical fertilizer usage, have not even spent a single rupee on this component (of RKVY)”, the report says, adding that “thus, we can conclude that there is hardly any support for ecological/organic fertilization”.
Fortunately, it is not too late. “The soil is in very poor health but we have not yet reached the stage where we have lost it completely. Even now farmers can reclaim their soil by shifting away from chemical fertilizers to ecological fertilisation, which will not only fix the problems in their soil but also provide sustained production”, co-author of the report Gopikrishna S R said while releasing the report. His survey shows 96 percent of farmers know that chemical fertilization leads to soil degradation and 98 percent showed willingness to switch to organic fertilizers “if these are subsidised and made easily available”. The report points out how chemical fertilizers cause depletion of water resources, salinity, hard pan formation, increased reliance on inorganic fertilizers, higher cost of cultivation, late showing of rabi crop and degradation of eco-system.
Needless to say, the course correction would require a shift in focus and the Greenpeace suggests several measures the essence of which is to generate and add large quantities of biomas in soil. These suggestions include various initiatives to promote in-situ (on farm) and ex-situ (outside farm) methods of biomas generation, supporting composting techniques, crop rotation or inter-cropping involving legumes, providing bio-fertilizers and farm-made manures and incentives to farmers to maintain proper soil health. The farmers are willing. All that is needed is institutional support, which is not such a tall order really.
The price of a Posco
Governance Now, Feb 15-28, 2011
The MoU with Orissa hands it over a bonanza of more than Rs 2,00,000 crore and a captive port to realise it
The “second” final clearance to Posco’s project in Orissa (the first one was granted on December 29, 2009), which comes attached with an astonishing 89 conditions in all - 28 old and 61 new - clearly establishes that a big corporate body can bulldoze its way through all environment and forest laws, regulations, notifications, binding guidelines and Jairam Ramesh.
Given the fact that the Orissa government is determined to set up the project at the very spot, never mind the strong opposition from the locals and gross violation of their legitimate rights, there is no stopping Posco now. The project is a virtual ‘fait accompli’ and is quite in keeping with the history of ministry of environment and forests (MoEF).
All these leave only one option for the victims and all those who believe development is meant for a greater common good, not corporate greed and that is to revisit the MoU Orissa government had signed with Posco on June 22, 2005. This has lapsed and will be renewed any time now. The intervening period provides the only window of opportunity to rectify the gross indiscretion.
A reading of the MoU throws up at least three key elements; two of which are not essential part of the project and the third spells trouble for Cuttack and nearby districts.
These are as follows:
» Proposed “export” of 400 million tonne of iron ore by Posco - which is apart from 600 million tonne it has sought by way of captive mines for producing 12 MT steel a year;
» Proposed “captive” port at the Jatadhar river-mouth and
» Proposed diversion of 10 MGD water from Cuttack’s Jobra barrage by laying 86-km-long pipeline to the project site.
Here is why these provisions require rewriting.
Export of Iron Ore: Posco provides no reason for seeking export of 400 MT iron ore other than a simple statement in the MoU saying that it is for “their existing steel plants in South Korea”. The key lies in decoding what it means for Posco.
Let us do some quick calculations. The FoB price of high-grade iron ore (Posco to get ore with 62 percent Fe content) is anywhere between $180 to $200 a tonne (that is between Rs 8,190 and Rs 9,100).
Praveen Paul, a Bangalore-based mining and bulk logistics expert, calculates that Posco will incur a cost of about Rs 2,500 a tonne – by way of extraction and beneficiation costs, royalty and permit and transportation to the port etc. Officials in the steel ministry and NMDC both say that this figure (Rs 2,500) is rather on the higher side.
Nevertheless, taking the mean FOB to be $190 (Rs 8,645) and the cost to be Rs 2,500, the net gain in exporting one tonne of iron ore works out to be Rs 6,145.
Now, assuming that Posco will be exporting 400 MT iron ore over a period of 30 years (lease period), it will be, on an average, exporting 13 MT every year.
So the net profit for exporting 13 MT of iron ore every year comes to Rs 7,988 crore. At this rate, Posco will earn, over the next 30 years, a whopping Rs 2, 39,640 crore!
That is a huge bonanza and as Paul comments, “a pure and simple gift to Posco”. Imagine, as against this, Posco promises to bring in Rs 51,000 crore for the project.
If Orissa were to export the same iron ore, it will be able to finance nearly 5 Posco plants in next 30 years.
Captive Port: Any wonder that Posco has made a “captive” port an integral part of its MoU? In fact, when the project-affected people approached the state government seeking to shift the project by a mere 3 km down south to avoid displacement of thousands, the proposal was shot down.
Priyabrata Patnaik, the state government’s nodal officer for the Posco project, told Governance Now: “The state government and Posco examined the proposal but both rejected it on technical grounds. It is not possible to shift the project because the port can’t be shifted.” It never crossed the mind of the state government that Posco does not really need a port of its own. There are at least two ports close by.
Pradip port is merely 12 km away from the proposed Posco port and has a capacity to handle 57 MT. It is in the process of adding another 59 MT by next year. A modern Dhamra port with a capacity of over 100 MT has become operational and is less than 60 km away. One more port is being proposed to be developed at Astrang, 25 km from the Posco site.
MoEF’s own expert panels too have questioned the need for the Posco port. The expert appraisal committee (EAC) raised a red flag in November 2010, pointing out the existence of both Paradip and Dhamra ports. The majority report of the MoEF expert team, headed by Meena Gupta, which submitted its report in October 2010, too brought up the same issue and had even sought revocation of clearance to the port for violating environment laws.
Way back in December 2005, minister for shipping, road transport and roadways, TR Balu, had told parliament that “the proposed minor port for Posco steel plant may lead to severe erosion along the coastline posing a threat to the port facilities at Paradip.” But the state government can’t be bothered with such trifles.
Water from Jobra Barrage: Number two of 61 additional conditions in Jairam Ramesh’s order of January 31, 2011 says: “Should there be a shortfall of water at the Jobra barrage for irrigation purposes, the company will voluntarily sacrifice water intake for facilitating irrigation.”
This is nothing short of a bad joke. For one, it admits to an existing water scarcity at Jobra barrage, which supplies drinking water to Cuttack and nearby areas, irrigation water to at least three districts - Cuttack, Jagatsinghpur and Kendrapara - and water to several industries. As it is, Jobra is unable to provide irrigation water in the lean season for the past two years. Will Posco close down its steel plant through “voluntary sacrifice”, as the order proposes, in case of the inevitable water scarcity? Highly unlikely.
It would have been, therefore, prudent to explore alternative source. The majority report of Meena Gupta committee too said that, confirming the existing water scarcity and pointing out that availability of water at Jobra was not even considered while signing the MoU. Worse, alternate sources exists - Hansua Nullah and Mahanadi’s downstream close to project site.
The conduct of the state and central governments may not inspire confidence, but this is the last opportunity to rectify what would be a monumental blunder if Orissa were to go ahead with its MoU unchanged. n
prasanna@governancenow.com
The MoU with Orissa hands it over a bonanza of more than Rs 2,00,000 crore and a captive port to realise it
The “second” final clearance to Posco’s project in Orissa (the first one was granted on December 29, 2009), which comes attached with an astonishing 89 conditions in all - 28 old and 61 new - clearly establishes that a big corporate body can bulldoze its way through all environment and forest laws, regulations, notifications, binding guidelines and Jairam Ramesh.
Given the fact that the Orissa government is determined to set up the project at the very spot, never mind the strong opposition from the locals and gross violation of their legitimate rights, there is no stopping Posco now. The project is a virtual ‘fait accompli’ and is quite in keeping with the history of ministry of environment and forests (MoEF).
All these leave only one option for the victims and all those who believe development is meant for a greater common good, not corporate greed and that is to revisit the MoU Orissa government had signed with Posco on June 22, 2005. This has lapsed and will be renewed any time now. The intervening period provides the only window of opportunity to rectify the gross indiscretion.
A reading of the MoU throws up at least three key elements; two of which are not essential part of the project and the third spells trouble for Cuttack and nearby districts.
These are as follows:
» Proposed “export” of 400 million tonne of iron ore by Posco - which is apart from 600 million tonne it has sought by way of captive mines for producing 12 MT steel a year;
» Proposed “captive” port at the Jatadhar river-mouth and
» Proposed diversion of 10 MGD water from Cuttack’s Jobra barrage by laying 86-km-long pipeline to the project site.
Here is why these provisions require rewriting.
Export of Iron Ore: Posco provides no reason for seeking export of 400 MT iron ore other than a simple statement in the MoU saying that it is for “their existing steel plants in South Korea”. The key lies in decoding what it means for Posco.
Let us do some quick calculations. The FoB price of high-grade iron ore (Posco to get ore with 62 percent Fe content) is anywhere between $180 to $200 a tonne (that is between Rs 8,190 and Rs 9,100).
Praveen Paul, a Bangalore-based mining and bulk logistics expert, calculates that Posco will incur a cost of about Rs 2,500 a tonne – by way of extraction and beneficiation costs, royalty and permit and transportation to the port etc. Officials in the steel ministry and NMDC both say that this figure (Rs 2,500) is rather on the higher side.
Nevertheless, taking the mean FOB to be $190 (Rs 8,645) and the cost to be Rs 2,500, the net gain in exporting one tonne of iron ore works out to be Rs 6,145.
Now, assuming that Posco will be exporting 400 MT iron ore over a period of 30 years (lease period), it will be, on an average, exporting 13 MT every year.
So the net profit for exporting 13 MT of iron ore every year comes to Rs 7,988 crore. At this rate, Posco will earn, over the next 30 years, a whopping Rs 2, 39,640 crore!
That is a huge bonanza and as Paul comments, “a pure and simple gift to Posco”. Imagine, as against this, Posco promises to bring in Rs 51,000 crore for the project.
If Orissa were to export the same iron ore, it will be able to finance nearly 5 Posco plants in next 30 years.
Captive Port: Any wonder that Posco has made a “captive” port an integral part of its MoU? In fact, when the project-affected people approached the state government seeking to shift the project by a mere 3 km down south to avoid displacement of thousands, the proposal was shot down.
Priyabrata Patnaik, the state government’s nodal officer for the Posco project, told Governance Now: “The state government and Posco examined the proposal but both rejected it on technical grounds. It is not possible to shift the project because the port can’t be shifted.” It never crossed the mind of the state government that Posco does not really need a port of its own. There are at least two ports close by.
Pradip port is merely 12 km away from the proposed Posco port and has a capacity to handle 57 MT. It is in the process of adding another 59 MT by next year. A modern Dhamra port with a capacity of over 100 MT has become operational and is less than 60 km away. One more port is being proposed to be developed at Astrang, 25 km from the Posco site.
MoEF’s own expert panels too have questioned the need for the Posco port. The expert appraisal committee (EAC) raised a red flag in November 2010, pointing out the existence of both Paradip and Dhamra ports. The majority report of the MoEF expert team, headed by Meena Gupta, which submitted its report in October 2010, too brought up the same issue and had even sought revocation of clearance to the port for violating environment laws.
Way back in December 2005, minister for shipping, road transport and roadways, TR Balu, had told parliament that “the proposed minor port for Posco steel plant may lead to severe erosion along the coastline posing a threat to the port facilities at Paradip.” But the state government can’t be bothered with such trifles.
Water from Jobra Barrage: Number two of 61 additional conditions in Jairam Ramesh’s order of January 31, 2011 says: “Should there be a shortfall of water at the Jobra barrage for irrigation purposes, the company will voluntarily sacrifice water intake for facilitating irrigation.”
This is nothing short of a bad joke. For one, it admits to an existing water scarcity at Jobra barrage, which supplies drinking water to Cuttack and nearby areas, irrigation water to at least three districts - Cuttack, Jagatsinghpur and Kendrapara - and water to several industries. As it is, Jobra is unable to provide irrigation water in the lean season for the past two years. Will Posco close down its steel plant through “voluntary sacrifice”, as the order proposes, in case of the inevitable water scarcity? Highly unlikely.
It would have been, therefore, prudent to explore alternative source. The majority report of Meena Gupta committee too said that, confirming the existing water scarcity and pointing out that availability of water at Jobra was not even considered while signing the MoU. Worse, alternate sources exists - Hansua Nullah and Mahanadi’s downstream close to project site.
The conduct of the state and central governments may not inspire confidence, but this is the last opportunity to rectify what would be a monumental blunder if Orissa were to go ahead with its MoU unchanged. n
prasanna@governancenow.com
Tuesday, February 1, 2011
Ramesh paves way for Posco’s Rs 11K crore bonanza
governancenow.com, feb 1, 2011
Don’t believe me? Read on
Nothing can be as absurd as the fresh environment clearance granted to the Posco project in Orissa on Monday.
Look at the order. It says:
* Environment clearance for the steel-cum-captive power plant is being given with 28 “additional conditions”;
* Environment clearance for the captive port is being given with 32 “additional conditions”;
* Diversion of forest land will be granted on the condition that the Orissa government gives “a categorical assurance” that no forest right claim exists and
* Should there be shortfall of water at Jobra barrage for irrigation, the company will voluntarily sacrifice water intake.
The “in principle” environment clearance granted to the project in September 2008 had 13 conditions attached to it. Additional 15 conditions were added to it when the “final” clearance was given in December 2009. The latest “final” clearance is the second one after Ramesh issued a stop order in August 2010.
Add up and you arrive at a list of 89 conditions (minus the water condition which is part of the set up 28)!
Ramesh needs to be asked some tough questions.
(i) What kind of “final-final” clearance is this that carries 89 pre-conditions?
(ii) Why clearance for a captive port (with 32 additional conditions) months after MoEF’s expert teams questioning Orissa government on the need for a captive port at a time when (i) Damra port has come up in the vicinity and (ii) Paradip port is being re-developed bang at the project site!
(iii) The stop order of August 2010 was issued because MoEF expert teams provided irrefutable evidence that forest rights of non-tribal traditional forest dwellers of the area had been denied. Why seek “assurance” from state government when MoEF’s “binding guideline” of 30 July 2009 which said compliance of forest right was mandatory for according clearances?
(iv) It is well known that Jobra barrage in Cuttack provides drinking water and irrigation water to Cuttack, Bhubaneswar and nearby areas. Supply of water is not adequate now. Allowing diversion of water to Posco’s project more than 100 km away will only aggravate it. So, why allow it and then put a condition of “voluntary sacrifice”? What happens when supply is short of drinking water need of Cuttack and Bhubaneswar? Will Posco plant be shut?
But more than these questions that arise out of the final-final” order of Mr Ramesh, there are a few fundamental ones that neither he nor the government (both central and state) has bothered to look into. One of those is the following:
State government’s MoU (which has, incidentally, lapsed and not renewed yet) with Posco proposes export of 400 million tonne of iron ore to its plants in South Korea. This is in addition to 600 million tonne of iron ore that the plant is seeking for producing 12 million tonne of steel annually, for which it has been prmosed captive mines.
Calculate Posco’s windfall gain by exporting 400 million tonne of iron ore which costs anywhere between Rs 3,000 to 7,000 a tonne in international market. POSCO will be paying only a nominal Rs 27 a tonne as royalty to the government. As Karnataka Lokayukta Santosh Hegde had calculated, extraction and transportation will cost will add up to around Rs 200 a tonne. Let us take total input cost is Rs 250 a tonne.
So, the windfall gain to Posco will be 400 million multiplied by Rs 2,750 (taking the price at lowest band, Rs 3,000 a tonne) and it comes to Rs 11,000 crore!
By giving the clearance Ramesh has paved the way for Rs 11,000 crore bonanza for Posco.
Posco will be investing Rs 51,000 crore, of which it will recover Rs 11,000 crore in export of iron ore alone.
The MoU does talk of "open market" arrangement for export of iron ore, but this makes little sense since Posco will be given captive mines as per the same MoU. Nothing stops Posco from sourcing the ore from its captive mines.
Don’t believe me? Read on
Nothing can be as absurd as the fresh environment clearance granted to the Posco project in Orissa on Monday.
Look at the order. It says:
* Environment clearance for the steel-cum-captive power plant is being given with 28 “additional conditions”;
* Environment clearance for the captive port is being given with 32 “additional conditions”;
* Diversion of forest land will be granted on the condition that the Orissa government gives “a categorical assurance” that no forest right claim exists and
* Should there be shortfall of water at Jobra barrage for irrigation, the company will voluntarily sacrifice water intake.
The “in principle” environment clearance granted to the project in September 2008 had 13 conditions attached to it. Additional 15 conditions were added to it when the “final” clearance was given in December 2009. The latest “final” clearance is the second one after Ramesh issued a stop order in August 2010.
Add up and you arrive at a list of 89 conditions (minus the water condition which is part of the set up 28)!
Ramesh needs to be asked some tough questions.
(i) What kind of “final-final” clearance is this that carries 89 pre-conditions?
(ii) Why clearance for a captive port (with 32 additional conditions) months after MoEF’s expert teams questioning Orissa government on the need for a captive port at a time when (i) Damra port has come up in the vicinity and (ii) Paradip port is being re-developed bang at the project site!
(iii) The stop order of August 2010 was issued because MoEF expert teams provided irrefutable evidence that forest rights of non-tribal traditional forest dwellers of the area had been denied. Why seek “assurance” from state government when MoEF’s “binding guideline” of 30 July 2009 which said compliance of forest right was mandatory for according clearances?
(iv) It is well known that Jobra barrage in Cuttack provides drinking water and irrigation water to Cuttack, Bhubaneswar and nearby areas. Supply of water is not adequate now. Allowing diversion of water to Posco’s project more than 100 km away will only aggravate it. So, why allow it and then put a condition of “voluntary sacrifice”? What happens when supply is short of drinking water need of Cuttack and Bhubaneswar? Will Posco plant be shut?
But more than these questions that arise out of the final-final” order of Mr Ramesh, there are a few fundamental ones that neither he nor the government (both central and state) has bothered to look into. One of those is the following:
State government’s MoU (which has, incidentally, lapsed and not renewed yet) with Posco proposes export of 400 million tonne of iron ore to its plants in South Korea. This is in addition to 600 million tonne of iron ore that the plant is seeking for producing 12 million tonne of steel annually, for which it has been prmosed captive mines.
Calculate Posco’s windfall gain by exporting 400 million tonne of iron ore which costs anywhere between Rs 3,000 to 7,000 a tonne in international market. POSCO will be paying only a nominal Rs 27 a tonne as royalty to the government. As Karnataka Lokayukta Santosh Hegde had calculated, extraction and transportation will cost will add up to around Rs 200 a tonne. Let us take total input cost is Rs 250 a tonne.
So, the windfall gain to Posco will be 400 million multiplied by Rs 2,750 (taking the price at lowest band, Rs 3,000 a tonne) and it comes to Rs 11,000 crore!
By giving the clearance Ramesh has paved the way for Rs 11,000 crore bonanza for Posco.
Posco will be investing Rs 51,000 crore, of which it will recover Rs 11,000 crore in export of iron ore alone.
The MoU does talk of "open market" arrangement for export of iron ore, but this makes little sense since Posco will be given captive mines as per the same MoU. Nothing stops Posco from sourcing the ore from its captive mines.
Monday, January 31, 2011
No room for Bhardwaj in Raj Bhavan
edit, governance now, feb 1-15, 2011
The Karnataka governor has lowered the dignity of office by playing dirty politics right from day one
Karnataka governor HR Bhardwaj may well be legally right in sanctioning prosecution of chief minister BS Yeddyurappa but, by doing so, he has clearly overreached his position to set the state on a collision course. Quite predictably, it has also snowballed into a bigger confrontation between the state and the centre and the two main political parties of the country, the Congress and the BJP. This was not only avoidable but also quite unnecessary. Days before Bhardwaj gave the nod for prosecution, the state cabinet had advised him to wait until two investigations into the allegations of corruption and nepotism against the chief minister were completed. The cabinet’s letter to him specified that the state Lokayukta and a judicial commission of enquiry were looking into different aspects of these allegations. Surely, he could ignore the advice (which the apex court upheld in the M.P. Special Police Establishment vs. State of Madhya Pradesh case of 2004, as union home minister P Chidambaram points out), but given the delicate nature of his relations with the state, Bhardwaj should have been advised caution and restraint by the centre. This was not the case and it was evident in Chidambaram’s statement the morning after. Bhardwaj’s action provoked another debate on the rationale of a constitutional figurehead who may be prone to playing politics.
And Bhardwaj, a former union law minister who was dropped by the UPA in its second term, has a history of playing dirty from day one of his new assignment. First, he made the government uncomfortable by harping on past communal incidents and then, with every crisis that the state government faced he turned more aggressive. He publicly sought information on illegal mining and corruption charges against ministers. By the time the government faced revolt within its ranks last October, he was at his worst. It was not only highly improper of him to ask the speaker of the assembly not to disqualify 16 rebelling legislators before the vote of confidence, he went on to recommend president’s rule when the government won the motion in a voice vote. He described the assembly proceedings as a “farce” and “unconstitutional”. It embarrassed both the centre, which rejected his recommendation, and his party, the Congress, which issued a statement saying that “as far as the governor is concerned, the party has nothing to do with him.” Bhardwaj then devised a face-saving exercise by seeking a second vote of confidence. Yeddyurappa won that too but the governor was not to sit quiet. Just days later he publicly reminded the chief minister that he was waiting for files relating to allegations of corruption.
The year 2011 began on an inauspicious note. The governor abandoned his customary joint address to the legislature and walked out after the opposition created ruckus over the ruling party’s description of him being a “Congress agent”. This was followed by another unsavoury incident. In response to the ruling party’s plan to hold a statewide protest against him, he shot back saying this was akin to “ulta chor kotwal ko daante”. By this time, Yeddyurappa had forwarded the cabinet resolution regarding the prosecution sanction. He was livid and wrote a strongly-worded letter protesting against the language and questioning the governor’s motive.
The prosecution sanction came less than 48 hours later and Chidambaram was wise enough to add that he was not going into the “merits” of the case while defending the governor’s right. Yeddyurappa may have his share of blemsishes and certainly his isn’t the cleanest of governments but by acting the way he has, Bhardwaj has not only lowered the dignity of his office he has created a political crisis which is contrary to his constitutional mandate. His opponents are right; the governor deserves to be recalled.
The Karnataka governor has lowered the dignity of office by playing dirty politics right from day one
Karnataka governor HR Bhardwaj may well be legally right in sanctioning prosecution of chief minister BS Yeddyurappa but, by doing so, he has clearly overreached his position to set the state on a collision course. Quite predictably, it has also snowballed into a bigger confrontation between the state and the centre and the two main political parties of the country, the Congress and the BJP. This was not only avoidable but also quite unnecessary. Days before Bhardwaj gave the nod for prosecution, the state cabinet had advised him to wait until two investigations into the allegations of corruption and nepotism against the chief minister were completed. The cabinet’s letter to him specified that the state Lokayukta and a judicial commission of enquiry were looking into different aspects of these allegations. Surely, he could ignore the advice (which the apex court upheld in the M.P. Special Police Establishment vs. State of Madhya Pradesh case of 2004, as union home minister P Chidambaram points out), but given the delicate nature of his relations with the state, Bhardwaj should have been advised caution and restraint by the centre. This was not the case and it was evident in Chidambaram’s statement the morning after. Bhardwaj’s action provoked another debate on the rationale of a constitutional figurehead who may be prone to playing politics.
And Bhardwaj, a former union law minister who was dropped by the UPA in its second term, has a history of playing dirty from day one of his new assignment. First, he made the government uncomfortable by harping on past communal incidents and then, with every crisis that the state government faced he turned more aggressive. He publicly sought information on illegal mining and corruption charges against ministers. By the time the government faced revolt within its ranks last October, he was at his worst. It was not only highly improper of him to ask the speaker of the assembly not to disqualify 16 rebelling legislators before the vote of confidence, he went on to recommend president’s rule when the government won the motion in a voice vote. He described the assembly proceedings as a “farce” and “unconstitutional”. It embarrassed both the centre, which rejected his recommendation, and his party, the Congress, which issued a statement saying that “as far as the governor is concerned, the party has nothing to do with him.” Bhardwaj then devised a face-saving exercise by seeking a second vote of confidence. Yeddyurappa won that too but the governor was not to sit quiet. Just days later he publicly reminded the chief minister that he was waiting for files relating to allegations of corruption.
The year 2011 began on an inauspicious note. The governor abandoned his customary joint address to the legislature and walked out after the opposition created ruckus over the ruling party’s description of him being a “Congress agent”. This was followed by another unsavoury incident. In response to the ruling party’s plan to hold a statewide protest against him, he shot back saying this was akin to “ulta chor kotwal ko daante”. By this time, Yeddyurappa had forwarded the cabinet resolution regarding the prosecution sanction. He was livid and wrote a strongly-worded letter protesting against the language and questioning the governor’s motive.
The prosecution sanction came less than 48 hours later and Chidambaram was wise enough to add that he was not going into the “merits” of the case while defending the governor’s right. Yeddyurappa may have his share of blemsishes and certainly his isn’t the cleanest of governments but by acting the way he has, Bhardwaj has not only lowered the dignity of his office he has created a political crisis which is contrary to his constitutional mandate. His opponents are right; the governor deserves to be recalled.
Mystery of the missing tribals
Governance Now, Feb 1-15, 2011
More than 40,000 Jhodias, the ‘principal tribe’ of Orissa’s Kashipur, find themselves disenfranchised for reasons nobody’s willing to admit or accept
Malati Jhodia, a young woman of Siriguda village in Orissa’s Kashipur, could have led a better life had she got what is legitimately hers, a scheduled tribe certificate. In absence of it she was denied the job of an anganwadi worker last year, which would have meant a princely sum of Rs 2,000 a month. Apart from her tribal status, the fact that she is a young bride from the village would have gone in her favour. Now she has to struggle as an ‘asha karmi’ (health worker) to find a pregnant woman willing to go to a government hospital for delivery so that she gets her quota of Rs 600.
For Pabitra Jhodia, her 26-year-old neighbour, it is tough to arrange for books, stationery, school bag and uniform for his six-year-old son who goes to a government school. His only source of cash is alashi, a mustard-like plant grown for oilseeds, that fetches him Rs 2,000-3,000 a year. His daughter will soon be going to school. Had he got his certificate as a tribal, he could have sent his son, and then the daughter, to a residential school meant for them which would have taken care of all their expenses, including food, until class 10.
I couldn’t meet Khit Jhodia’s 10-year-old son and 14-year-old daughter. Both were away at the time, herding their cattle somewhere up in the hills. The father regrets having pulled them out of school because he couldn’t afford it any more. If only he could get the certificate identifying his tribal status, the children’s education would have been taken care of.
About 30 km away, in Dimundi village on the outskirts of Utkal Alumina’s plant in Kucheipadar, a Jhodia youth sits in gloom as he narrates how his family had to shell out Rs 23,000 as donation to study in an ITI institute in Koraput from the compensation amount they received for their land acquired for the company. “No Jhodia of Kashipur is getting certificate as a tribal. I went to the tehsildar several times; the most recent one was four months ago. The tehsildar said I belong to the general category,” he says.
Missing Jhodias
There are, in fact, thousands of Jhodias who are being deprived of education, stipends, scholarships, cycles meant for girl students, jobs, subsidised loans for housing and agriculture and many such benefits that the government provides for the tribals in this picturesque land of rolling hills in the Maoist-affected Rayagada district. Without their certificates, they are being treated as general category people.
This is quite intriguing. For, the district gazetteer of Koraput, 1966, clearly spells out the “caste and tribes” of Kashipur in these words: “The principal tribes found are the Jhorias, the Pengu Khonds and the Khonds.” (Just as ‘d’ in Odisha and Odia became ‘r’ in Orissa and Oriya then, Jhodias were spelt Jhorias.)
There wasn’t a problem until late 1980s. The first ST list of Orissa, notified in 1976, mentions ‘Paroja’ as the scheduled tribe (serial number 55), in the present context. The Jhodias were recognised as a ‘sub-section’ of Paroja (“endogamous section of the Paroja”). There exist hundreds of land and settlement records and certificates issued by the district administration showing that the Jhodias belong to the Paroja tribe.
There are also several official communiqués from the district collector of Rayagada to the Kashipur tehsildar between 1989 and 2010, confirming their tribal status and directing that such certificates be issued to them. The last one was written on May 13, 2010, by the present collector, Dr Nitin Bhanudas Jawale, the concluding line of which reads: “Hence, these instructions be strictly followed and no such eligible persons in whose RORs (record of rights) his caste (has been) mentioned as Jhodia and he otherwise belongs to non-tribal group be denied ST certificate.”
When the 1976 list was amended and published in 2003, ‘Paroja’ was replaced with several variations of Paroja, its sub-sections including variations of Jhodia, but not ‘Jhodia’ per se. There were, in fact, 12 communities that replaced
‘Paroja’ – Parja, Bodo Paroja, Barong Jhodia, Poroja, Chhelia Paroja, Jhodia Paroja, Konda Paraja, Paraja, Ponga Paroja, Sodia Paroja, Sano Paroja and Solia Paroja. Inclusion of ‘Jhodia Paroja’ seemed to provide some leeway, but it was not to be.
While seeking to include Jhodia in the ST list, the state government had issued executive instructions that Jhodia ‘being synonymous’ to Jhodia Paroja and a section of the notified tribe Paroja, the members of the Jhodia community should be recognised and extended the benefit of the ST, after field verification.
This didn’t work because of a 1996 supreme court order. In the Nityananda Sharma vs State of Bihar case, the apex court had said the presidential order notifying the lists of SCs and STs, and the subsequent amendments to these lists made by the parliament, were “conclusive” on which no courts had jurisdiction for interpretation.
The present tehsildar, Sushant Singh, admits that the Jhodias used to get the ST certificates earlier and availed all benefits thus accrued but this was discontinued after the apex court order, which left no scope for interpretations. He says he now issues ST certificates only to those whose land and settlement record (carried out in 1993-94) mentions their caste either as ‘Paroja’ or ‘Jhodia Paroja’. Not the others. As it happened, most of the community members who had faced no inconvenience in the past and were unaware of what awaited them, had recorded their caste as ‘Jhodia’, the usual practice, during the land settlement of 1993-94. That landed them in a soup.
Mystery Deepens
According to Makarand Muduli, president of the Paroja Samaj, a body set up in 1997 to fight for the restoration of tribal status to the Jhodias, there are about 23,000 Jhodia voters in Kashipur alone and the population of the community is over 40,000. A majority of them have lost their tribal status. In protest, they had even boycotted the last assembly elections in 2009.
Muduli, a Jhodia, says the problem first surfaced around 1987 when some community members were denied the ST certificate. Protests that followed forced the state government to provide intermittent relief but after the 1996 apex court judgment, this was no longer possible.
Under pressure, the state government started sending proposals to the centre to include ‘Jhodia’ in the ST list since 1989 but it was a clumsy effort. The last proposal before the 2003 notification was made on November 20, 2002. The centre sat over it and the state conveniently forgot it until 2006. In 2006, the centre said the registrar general of India (RGI) had “rejected” the proposal on four grounds: (a) the state’s recommendation about Jhodia is based on a single village study; (b) as per the socio-economic features given, Jhodia is not a tribe but a caste, as they suffer from social disabilities and treated as untouchables by the caste Hindus; (c) the report doesn’t reveal similarity in socio-cultural traits between Jhodia and Paraja; and (d) published literature doesn’t support Jhodia as synonym of section of Paraja.
The state responded back the same year with some more details, which was clearly not adequate and was rejected two years later in 2008. Taking the second rejection by RGI as a plea, the tribal affairs ministry at the centre also rejected it. Now, a fresh broad-based ethnic study covering five blocks of four districts (Rayagada, Koraput, Nawrangpur and Kalahandi), prepared by the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes Research and Training Institute (SCSTRTI) of the government of Orissa, has been submitted (May 2010). Given the current pre-occupation of the RGI with the census, it is unlikely to be taken up any time soon.
Mining Interest
Given their presence and the historic nature of injustice, one would have expected the political parties to kill each other to champion the Jhodia cause. But the fact is, just the opposite has happened. This is not unusual for Orissa. Not a single political party, save a marginal player like the Communist Party of India (CPI), has supported any of the revolts brewing against mining and industrial projects in the state. And it is not difficult to understand why.
Kashipur drew attention to itself first because of starvation deaths in the 1960s and 1980s and later, the discovery of its rich bauxite deposits. Once NALCO, a public sector unit, started mining the Panchapatmali hills and set up its refinery in adjoining Koraput district in mid 80s, Kashipur became the next target. Industrial houses lined up to sign MoUs with Orissa. Utkal Alumina, a joint venture of Hindalco and Alcan Aluminium, came into being in 1993 and by September 1995, it had received environment clearance from the centre to mine the Baphlamali hills and set up a plant in Kucheipadar. L&T and Balco (which Sterlite took over in 2001) too signed up MoUs to mine the Kuturumali and Sasbahumali, respectively, around that time. Soon, Aditya Aluminium too jumped in and will be setting up its plant and a mining venture shortly. But surveys of villages around the bauxite carrying hills had begun in late 1980s.
Notice the remarkable coincidence of a peaking interest in bauxite with the beginning of the trouble for the Jhodias of Kashipur.
Fifteen years of protests and the consequent violence and deaths saw many (Tata and Sterlite) fleeing the scene. Norsk Hydro of Norway abandoned its plans for a joint venture when persecution of the tribals became too much of an ethical issue for it to ignore. But Utkal Alumina persisted, despite a huge uproar over the Maikanch killings in December 2000 in which three people were shot dead and several others were injured by the state police. All the dead were officially identified as the Jhodias – Abhilas Jhodia, Raghu Jhodia and Jamudhar Jhodia. So were the injured. That gives another clear clue. Three villages under the Utkal Alumina’s Baphlamali mining project – Mikanch, Paikkupakhal and Andrakanch – are all Jhodia-dominated ones.
“Out of this Earth: East India Adivasis and the Aluminium Cartel”, a book by Felix Padel and Samarendra Das, provides an account of how all the constitutional rights of the tribals were bypassed to acquire their land in Kashipur. The pattern was confirmed by the N C Saxena committee earlier this year which looked into Vedanta’s Niyamgiri project in Lanjigarh (adjoining Kashipur in Rayagada).
According to Rayagada collector, 3,432 acre of land have been acquired for mining and 2,638 acres (2,155 acre of which is private) for alumina plants in Kashipur block. These are spread over 27 villages. Land in four more villages is being
acquired for Aditya Aluminium.
Giridhar Gamang, who as chief minister in 1999 claimed to have forwarded a proposal to include the Jhodias in the ST list, is unequivocal in blaming the mining lobby for the tribal community’s plight. “The industry manipulated the case (to rob the Jhodias of tribal status) in fear that the land acquired on their behalf would be taken away,” he said.
But Achyut Das of Agragamee, a Kashipur-based NGO, is closer to truth. Having fought for restoration of the tribal status to the Jhodias and suffered on account of this, Das sums up the situation: “The tribal status of the Jhodias was never an issue before the mining interest came in. The centre and the state colluded to deny them their legitimate rights.”
prasanna@governancenow.com
More than 40,000 Jhodias, the ‘principal tribe’ of Orissa’s Kashipur, find themselves disenfranchised for reasons nobody’s willing to admit or accept
Malati Jhodia, a young woman of Siriguda village in Orissa’s Kashipur, could have led a better life had she got what is legitimately hers, a scheduled tribe certificate. In absence of it she was denied the job of an anganwadi worker last year, which would have meant a princely sum of Rs 2,000 a month. Apart from her tribal status, the fact that she is a young bride from the village would have gone in her favour. Now she has to struggle as an ‘asha karmi’ (health worker) to find a pregnant woman willing to go to a government hospital for delivery so that she gets her quota of Rs 600.
For Pabitra Jhodia, her 26-year-old neighbour, it is tough to arrange for books, stationery, school bag and uniform for his six-year-old son who goes to a government school. His only source of cash is alashi, a mustard-like plant grown for oilseeds, that fetches him Rs 2,000-3,000 a year. His daughter will soon be going to school. Had he got his certificate as a tribal, he could have sent his son, and then the daughter, to a residential school meant for them which would have taken care of all their expenses, including food, until class 10.
I couldn’t meet Khit Jhodia’s 10-year-old son and 14-year-old daughter. Both were away at the time, herding their cattle somewhere up in the hills. The father regrets having pulled them out of school because he couldn’t afford it any more. If only he could get the certificate identifying his tribal status, the children’s education would have been taken care of.
About 30 km away, in Dimundi village on the outskirts of Utkal Alumina’s plant in Kucheipadar, a Jhodia youth sits in gloom as he narrates how his family had to shell out Rs 23,000 as donation to study in an ITI institute in Koraput from the compensation amount they received for their land acquired for the company. “No Jhodia of Kashipur is getting certificate as a tribal. I went to the tehsildar several times; the most recent one was four months ago. The tehsildar said I belong to the general category,” he says.
Missing Jhodias
There are, in fact, thousands of Jhodias who are being deprived of education, stipends, scholarships, cycles meant for girl students, jobs, subsidised loans for housing and agriculture and many such benefits that the government provides for the tribals in this picturesque land of rolling hills in the Maoist-affected Rayagada district. Without their certificates, they are being treated as general category people.
This is quite intriguing. For, the district gazetteer of Koraput, 1966, clearly spells out the “caste and tribes” of Kashipur in these words: “The principal tribes found are the Jhorias, the Pengu Khonds and the Khonds.” (Just as ‘d’ in Odisha and Odia became ‘r’ in Orissa and Oriya then, Jhodias were spelt Jhorias.)
There wasn’t a problem until late 1980s. The first ST list of Orissa, notified in 1976, mentions ‘Paroja’ as the scheduled tribe (serial number 55), in the present context. The Jhodias were recognised as a ‘sub-section’ of Paroja (“endogamous section of the Paroja”). There exist hundreds of land and settlement records and certificates issued by the district administration showing that the Jhodias belong to the Paroja tribe.
There are also several official communiqués from the district collector of Rayagada to the Kashipur tehsildar between 1989 and 2010, confirming their tribal status and directing that such certificates be issued to them. The last one was written on May 13, 2010, by the present collector, Dr Nitin Bhanudas Jawale, the concluding line of which reads: “Hence, these instructions be strictly followed and no such eligible persons in whose RORs (record of rights) his caste (has been) mentioned as Jhodia and he otherwise belongs to non-tribal group be denied ST certificate.”
When the 1976 list was amended and published in 2003, ‘Paroja’ was replaced with several variations of Paroja, its sub-sections including variations of Jhodia, but not ‘Jhodia’ per se. There were, in fact, 12 communities that replaced
‘Paroja’ – Parja, Bodo Paroja, Barong Jhodia, Poroja, Chhelia Paroja, Jhodia Paroja, Konda Paraja, Paraja, Ponga Paroja, Sodia Paroja, Sano Paroja and Solia Paroja. Inclusion of ‘Jhodia Paroja’ seemed to provide some leeway, but it was not to be.
While seeking to include Jhodia in the ST list, the state government had issued executive instructions that Jhodia ‘being synonymous’ to Jhodia Paroja and a section of the notified tribe Paroja, the members of the Jhodia community should be recognised and extended the benefit of the ST, after field verification.
This didn’t work because of a 1996 supreme court order. In the Nityananda Sharma vs State of Bihar case, the apex court had said the presidential order notifying the lists of SCs and STs, and the subsequent amendments to these lists made by the parliament, were “conclusive” on which no courts had jurisdiction for interpretation.
The present tehsildar, Sushant Singh, admits that the Jhodias used to get the ST certificates earlier and availed all benefits thus accrued but this was discontinued after the apex court order, which left no scope for interpretations. He says he now issues ST certificates only to those whose land and settlement record (carried out in 1993-94) mentions their caste either as ‘Paroja’ or ‘Jhodia Paroja’. Not the others. As it happened, most of the community members who had faced no inconvenience in the past and were unaware of what awaited them, had recorded their caste as ‘Jhodia’, the usual practice, during the land settlement of 1993-94. That landed them in a soup.
Mystery Deepens
According to Makarand Muduli, president of the Paroja Samaj, a body set up in 1997 to fight for the restoration of tribal status to the Jhodias, there are about 23,000 Jhodia voters in Kashipur alone and the population of the community is over 40,000. A majority of them have lost their tribal status. In protest, they had even boycotted the last assembly elections in 2009.
Muduli, a Jhodia, says the problem first surfaced around 1987 when some community members were denied the ST certificate. Protests that followed forced the state government to provide intermittent relief but after the 1996 apex court judgment, this was no longer possible.
Under pressure, the state government started sending proposals to the centre to include ‘Jhodia’ in the ST list since 1989 but it was a clumsy effort. The last proposal before the 2003 notification was made on November 20, 2002. The centre sat over it and the state conveniently forgot it until 2006. In 2006, the centre said the registrar general of India (RGI) had “rejected” the proposal on four grounds: (a) the state’s recommendation about Jhodia is based on a single village study; (b) as per the socio-economic features given, Jhodia is not a tribe but a caste, as they suffer from social disabilities and treated as untouchables by the caste Hindus; (c) the report doesn’t reveal similarity in socio-cultural traits between Jhodia and Paraja; and (d) published literature doesn’t support Jhodia as synonym of section of Paraja.
The state responded back the same year with some more details, which was clearly not adequate and was rejected two years later in 2008. Taking the second rejection by RGI as a plea, the tribal affairs ministry at the centre also rejected it. Now, a fresh broad-based ethnic study covering five blocks of four districts (Rayagada, Koraput, Nawrangpur and Kalahandi), prepared by the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes Research and Training Institute (SCSTRTI) of the government of Orissa, has been submitted (May 2010). Given the current pre-occupation of the RGI with the census, it is unlikely to be taken up any time soon.
Mining Interest
Given their presence and the historic nature of injustice, one would have expected the political parties to kill each other to champion the Jhodia cause. But the fact is, just the opposite has happened. This is not unusual for Orissa. Not a single political party, save a marginal player like the Communist Party of India (CPI), has supported any of the revolts brewing against mining and industrial projects in the state. And it is not difficult to understand why.
Kashipur drew attention to itself first because of starvation deaths in the 1960s and 1980s and later, the discovery of its rich bauxite deposits. Once NALCO, a public sector unit, started mining the Panchapatmali hills and set up its refinery in adjoining Koraput district in mid 80s, Kashipur became the next target. Industrial houses lined up to sign MoUs with Orissa. Utkal Alumina, a joint venture of Hindalco and Alcan Aluminium, came into being in 1993 and by September 1995, it had received environment clearance from the centre to mine the Baphlamali hills and set up a plant in Kucheipadar. L&T and Balco (which Sterlite took over in 2001) too signed up MoUs to mine the Kuturumali and Sasbahumali, respectively, around that time. Soon, Aditya Aluminium too jumped in and will be setting up its plant and a mining venture shortly. But surveys of villages around the bauxite carrying hills had begun in late 1980s.
Notice the remarkable coincidence of a peaking interest in bauxite with the beginning of the trouble for the Jhodias of Kashipur.
Fifteen years of protests and the consequent violence and deaths saw many (Tata and Sterlite) fleeing the scene. Norsk Hydro of Norway abandoned its plans for a joint venture when persecution of the tribals became too much of an ethical issue for it to ignore. But Utkal Alumina persisted, despite a huge uproar over the Maikanch killings in December 2000 in which three people were shot dead and several others were injured by the state police. All the dead were officially identified as the Jhodias – Abhilas Jhodia, Raghu Jhodia and Jamudhar Jhodia. So were the injured. That gives another clear clue. Three villages under the Utkal Alumina’s Baphlamali mining project – Mikanch, Paikkupakhal and Andrakanch – are all Jhodia-dominated ones.
“Out of this Earth: East India Adivasis and the Aluminium Cartel”, a book by Felix Padel and Samarendra Das, provides an account of how all the constitutional rights of the tribals were bypassed to acquire their land in Kashipur. The pattern was confirmed by the N C Saxena committee earlier this year which looked into Vedanta’s Niyamgiri project in Lanjigarh (adjoining Kashipur in Rayagada).
According to Rayagada collector, 3,432 acre of land have been acquired for mining and 2,638 acres (2,155 acre of which is private) for alumina plants in Kashipur block. These are spread over 27 villages. Land in four more villages is being
acquired for Aditya Aluminium.
Giridhar Gamang, who as chief minister in 1999 claimed to have forwarded a proposal to include the Jhodias in the ST list, is unequivocal in blaming the mining lobby for the tribal community’s plight. “The industry manipulated the case (to rob the Jhodias of tribal status) in fear that the land acquired on their behalf would be taken away,” he said.
But Achyut Das of Agragamee, a Kashipur-based NGO, is closer to truth. Having fought for restoration of the tribal status to the Jhodias and suffered on account of this, Das sums up the situation: “The tribal status of the Jhodias was never an issue before the mining interest came in. The centre and the state colluded to deny them their legitimate rights.”
prasanna@governancenow.com
Hunter's guide to fight corruption
governancenow.com, jan 31, 2011
Punish the guilty. Period.
‘March against corruption’ across several cities of the country last Sunday, which was spearheaded by RTI activist Arvind Kejriwal and in which anti-corruption crusaders like Prashant Bhushan, JM Lyngdoh, JF Ribeiro and Medha Patkar, among others, participated, makes two broad points. One that corruption is no longer a non-issue and that people are angry enough to come out to the streets in thousands (about 25,000 participated in the march in Delhi, according to Kejriwal) to register their protests. And secondly, that a pitch is being laid for an eventual enactment of the Lokpal as the apex anti-corruption watchdog.
The last time corruption was a big issue and shook the establishment, leading to the enactment of the central vigilance commission (CVC), was in 1995 when the Jain Hawala scam broke out. Delhi-based businessmen, the Jain brothers – SK Jain, BK Jain and NK Jain – were accused of paying Rs 65 crore to political bigwigs that included LK Advani, Madan Lal Khurana, VC Shukla, Arif Khan, Sharad Yadav, Balram Jakhar, P Shiv Shankar and more than 100 others. A bulk of it was through the hawala routes and included suspected money transfer to the Hizbul Mujahideen militants. Vineet Narain, a journalist, spearheaded the crusade that led to a historic Hawala judgment of the supreme court – which prepared the ground for legislating CVC to insulate CBI and ED and fixed two years' term for the directors of CBI and ED.
Given the similarity of the run-up to the historic Hawala judgment, I called up Vineet Narain to ask if he participated in the march and if not why not. He said he did go to the function but walked away because he thought it would lead to nowhere, just as it was then in mid-90s.
Narain makes two broad points to justify his walkout. One, he says setting up an institution, Lokpal in this case and CVC in the earlier instance, will serve no purpose. “I had asked the supreme court at that time: What is the need for CVC? If you want to empower the CBI, give it autonomy!” He laments how the entire establishment got busied with preparing the CVC Act, ignoring the actual investigation and prosecution of the accused. The CBI didn’t provide evidence in the court, except for the Jain diaries which had mentioned details of the payment. The courts acquitted all the accused citing lack of independent corroborative evidence.
Narain also laments that had enough attention been paid to punishing the accused, things would have been different. “Did CVC make any difference?” he asks as he points to the fiasco over the appointment of current incumbent, PJ Thomas, and wonders aloud: “Who knows when the Lokpal will come into being and what kind of man will he be.”
Narain has a simple solution to fight corruption and illustrates it through a well-known quiz for the kids: After a hunter shoots and kills two of 100 birds sitting on a tree how many will be left on the tree?
He is for the hunter’s approach. Take up three or four high-profile corruption cases (and there are plenty of them now – 2G, CWG, Adarsh society, IPL, Swiss account etc), make exemplary cases of them by punishing the guilty and things will fall in place!
Last Friday, the prime-minister-in-waiting Rahul Gandhi addressed people on the corruption issue and said “systemic reforms” were needed to root it out. Earlier UPA chairperson Sonia Gandhi had forwarded her "5-point agenda" to fight corruption. Following this the prime minister set up an empowered Group of Minister (eGoM) under his number 2, Pranab Mukherjee, to find ways and means to do so. Kejriwal and others are batting for their version of the Lokpal bill.
But I would rather endorse Narain's: Forget eGoMs, systemic reforms and Lokpals. If you are serious, focus all your energy on fixing responsibilities and giving exemplary punishment to those involved in 2G, CWG, Adarsh society and other scams. That will scare away the birds of similar feathers!
Punish the guilty. Period.
‘March against corruption’ across several cities of the country last Sunday, which was spearheaded by RTI activist Arvind Kejriwal and in which anti-corruption crusaders like Prashant Bhushan, JM Lyngdoh, JF Ribeiro and Medha Patkar, among others, participated, makes two broad points. One that corruption is no longer a non-issue and that people are angry enough to come out to the streets in thousands (about 25,000 participated in the march in Delhi, according to Kejriwal) to register their protests. And secondly, that a pitch is being laid for an eventual enactment of the Lokpal as the apex anti-corruption watchdog.
The last time corruption was a big issue and shook the establishment, leading to the enactment of the central vigilance commission (CVC), was in 1995 when the Jain Hawala scam broke out. Delhi-based businessmen, the Jain brothers – SK Jain, BK Jain and NK Jain – were accused of paying Rs 65 crore to political bigwigs that included LK Advani, Madan Lal Khurana, VC Shukla, Arif Khan, Sharad Yadav, Balram Jakhar, P Shiv Shankar and more than 100 others. A bulk of it was through the hawala routes and included suspected money transfer to the Hizbul Mujahideen militants. Vineet Narain, a journalist, spearheaded the crusade that led to a historic Hawala judgment of the supreme court – which prepared the ground for legislating CVC to insulate CBI and ED and fixed two years' term for the directors of CBI and ED.
Given the similarity of the run-up to the historic Hawala judgment, I called up Vineet Narain to ask if he participated in the march and if not why not. He said he did go to the function but walked away because he thought it would lead to nowhere, just as it was then in mid-90s.
Narain makes two broad points to justify his walkout. One, he says setting up an institution, Lokpal in this case and CVC in the earlier instance, will serve no purpose. “I had asked the supreme court at that time: What is the need for CVC? If you want to empower the CBI, give it autonomy!” He laments how the entire establishment got busied with preparing the CVC Act, ignoring the actual investigation and prosecution of the accused. The CBI didn’t provide evidence in the court, except for the Jain diaries which had mentioned details of the payment. The courts acquitted all the accused citing lack of independent corroborative evidence.
Narain also laments that had enough attention been paid to punishing the accused, things would have been different. “Did CVC make any difference?” he asks as he points to the fiasco over the appointment of current incumbent, PJ Thomas, and wonders aloud: “Who knows when the Lokpal will come into being and what kind of man will he be.”
Narain has a simple solution to fight corruption and illustrates it through a well-known quiz for the kids: After a hunter shoots and kills two of 100 birds sitting on a tree how many will be left on the tree?
He is for the hunter’s approach. Take up three or four high-profile corruption cases (and there are plenty of them now – 2G, CWG, Adarsh society, IPL, Swiss account etc), make exemplary cases of them by punishing the guilty and things will fall in place!
Last Friday, the prime-minister-in-waiting Rahul Gandhi addressed people on the corruption issue and said “systemic reforms” were needed to root it out. Earlier UPA chairperson Sonia Gandhi had forwarded her "5-point agenda" to fight corruption. Following this the prime minister set up an empowered Group of Minister (eGoM) under his number 2, Pranab Mukherjee, to find ways and means to do so. Kejriwal and others are batting for their version of the Lokpal bill.
But I would rather endorse Narain's: Forget eGoMs, systemic reforms and Lokpals. If you are serious, focus all your energy on fixing responsibilities and giving exemplary punishment to those involved in 2G, CWG, Adarsh society and other scams. That will scare away the birds of similar feathers!
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